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ABSTRACT

What is an information, communication and technology (“ICT”)
company to do when operating in the midst of an international
armed conflict like the one raging in Ukraine? How should tech
company executives respond to urgent government demands—often
conflicting—to propagate or censor online content arising in the
context of war, including disinformation? And what of their requests
to access the personal data or communications of users, ostensibly to
safeguard security but nonetheless presenting the potential for
abuse? Governments make difficult demands of ICT companies by
seeking to impose heavy restrictions on the free flow of information
and data privacy via the latter’s digital and social media platforms
and mobile networks. This obligates the companies to devise new
practices and policies to respond to those demands and the exigent
circumstances that create them. To assist in that process, this Article
57
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maps the contours of the frameworks under international law—
international humanitarian and human rights law, primarily—that
exist to guide company executives and other stakeholders who seek
to follow a principled pathway to addressing such challenges. To that
end, the Article first demarcates the respective scopes of application
for international humanitarian and human rights law; it then
analyzes the normative interplay between those two bodies of law
using real and hypothetical examples drawn from the international
armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia. By delving into the IHLIHRL nexus and its function in the context of international armed
conflict, the Article facilitates the constructive consideration of
international legal norms by private sector actors and other nongovernmental stakeholders invested in propagating the principle of
humanity in this most difficult of settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 unleashed
more than just the former’s military might against the territory of
its neighbor: it also set into motion a new era of power dynamics
on the internet. Technology companies whose platforms and
applications dominate the digital realm have found themselves in
the eye of a geopolitical storm, besieged by government demands
from all sides of the war unfolding in Ukraine to restrict the flow
of, or provide access to, information. 1 This pressure to comply with
State policies shaped by the international armed conflict between
Russia and Ukraine, which is Europe’s first since World War II, is

* I would like to thank the following persons for their input on previous drafts of this
Article: Jason Pielemeier, Jennifer Easterday, Evelyn Aswad, and Jonathan Horowitz. In
addition, I am grateful to my research assistants Brooke Laing and Marco Guzman, for their
excellent support. Finally, I want to acknowledge the important role that my membership
and participation in the Global Network Initiative (GNI) played in the development of this
Article.
** Arturo J. Carrillo is Clinical Professor of Law and founding Director of the Civil and
Human Rights Law Clinic at the George Washington University Law School, where he also
co-directs the Global Internet Freedom Project.
1. See Adam Satariano & Sheera Frenkel, Ukraine War Tests the Power of Tech Giants,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/28/technology/ukrainerussia-social-media.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/45QS-G9UH].
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exemplified by the European Commission’s creation of a “crisis
mechanism” through the enactment of the Digital Services Act
(“DSA”) in April of 2022. 2 This novel mechanism grants the
Commission the authority, in times of crisis involving threats to
public health or national security, to impose “a state of emergency
on social media sites, search engines, and online marketplaces.” 3 It
means that any of the twenty-seven national governments
comprising the European Union may invoke the mechanism to
censor content they deem a threat arising from the Ukraine
conflict, such as war propaganda or disinformation, something the
European Union had already acted to do. 4 The European Union’s
new expanded authority extends over all the world’s major online
platforms, including Meta, Google, YouTube, TikTok and Amazon. 5
The DSA and its grant of authority to order ICT companies to
regulate offending conduct online applies only to content that can
be viewed in Europe. 6 ICT companies must also respond to the
stream of similar demands from the warring parties themselves:
Russia and Ukraine. 7 Unsurprisingly, the governments of both
belligerents have been sending dueling requests to block access or
restrict online content and telecommunications in a variety of
forms. For example, Russia is pressuring big technology companies
to censor social media posts and other information flows inside the
country on top of already restricting domestic access to those sites,
as it did with Facebook and Twitter. 8 The Putin government has
also ordered platforms outside of Russia to lift their restrictions on
pro-Kremlin media outlets related to Ukraine. 9 The Zelenskiy

2 . Morgan Meaker, Ukraine War Prompts Europe’s New Emergency Rules for the
Internet, WIRED (Apr. 25, 2022), https://www.wired.com/story/europe-digital-servicesact/ [https://perma.cc/6ZGR-8JK8].
3. Id.
4. See Natasha Lomas, EU’s Ban on Russia Today and Sputnik is Now in Effect, TECH
CRUNCH (Mar. 2, 2022), [https://perma.cc/9S9W-HAFT].
5. See Meaker, supra note 2.
6. See id.
7. See id., Satariano & Frenkel, supra note 1.
8. See Dan Milmo, Russia Blocks Access to Facebook and Twitter, THE GUARDIAN (Mar.
4,
2022),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/russia-completelyblocks-access-to-facebook-and-twitter [https://perma.cc/D4AC-TCRH].
9. Adam Satariano, Russia Intensifies Censorship Campaign, Pressuring Tech Giants,
N.Y. Times (Feb. 26, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/26/technology/russiacensorship-tech.html [https://perma.cc/U82V-9ML3].
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government in turn sent a letter to Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) to urge the nongovernmental group to revoke the most common Russian internet
domains and shut down the domain name system (“DNS”) 10 root
servers in Russian territory. 11 In addition, Ukrainian authorities
have for years sought to curtail inside the country the influx of
Russian propaganda channeled through traditional and digital
media, and now seek to do so more urgently than ever. 12
In the face of such chaos—unprecedented in this digital
dimension—what is an ICT company to do? How should
responsible technology companies respond to government
demands to regulate online content arising in and around
international armed conflicts, such as war propaganda? How
should they respond to similar demands to provide access to
personal data related to, or asserted to be justified by, the conduct
of war? Is their decision-making at bottom just a “judgment call,”
as some company executives would have it? 13 Are technology
companies simply required to “choose a side” when presented with
competing demands by State parties to the conflict? What about
others who are not active belligerents themselves but have
expressly sided with one? Or is there a more principled approach
to digital realm decision-making in the context of an armed
conflict? Fortunately, the answer to the last question is decidedly
in the affirmative. As this Article will explain, ICT companies and
others can and should draw upon existing normative frameworks
10. ”The Domain Name System (DNS) is the Internet’s system for mapping alphabetic
names to numeric Internet Protocol (IP) addresses like a phonebook maps a person’s name
to a phone number.” What is a Domain Name and How Does DNS Work?, THOUSAND EYES,
PART OF CISCO, https://www.thousandeyes.com/learning/techtorials/dns-domain-namesystem [https://perma.cc/NKE4-LGQ8] (last visited July 29, 2022).
11. See Jon Brodkin, Ukraine Asks ICANN to Revoke Russian Domains and Shut Down
DNS Root Servers, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 2, 2022), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2022/03/ukraine-wants-russia-cut-off-from-core-internet-systems-experts-sayits-a-bad-idea/[https://perma.cc/9XTK-EV8E].
12. Words and Wars: Ukraine Facing Ukraine Propaganda, UKR. WORLD (Sept. 7, 2022),
https://ukraineworld.org/articles/infowars/words-and-wars-ukraine-facing-russianpropaganda [https://perma.cc/C69B-BHK7].
13. Satariano & Frenkel, supra note 1.
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to guide their actions during a geopolitical crisis like the one
generated by the war in Ukraine.
Indeed, ICT companies in wartime, like in peacetime, should
be guided by pre-existing frameworks of international legal norms
designed precisely for this purpose. In times of peace, human
rights law provides a series of principles organized into a widelyaccepted framework for how private-sector businesses should
conduct themselves when confronted with government abuses and
related challenges. 14 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights 15 (“UNGP”) have been adapted to the business
models of ICT companies and applied to the protection of freedom
of expression and privacy rights online through multi-stakeholder
initiatives like the Global Network Initiative (“GNI”). 16 But human
rights law was not designed for wartime, which is the bailiwick of
international humanitarian law (IHL), also commonly referred to
as the laws of armed conflict (LOAC). 17 To quote John Ruggie, the
former UN expert on business and human rights who oversaw the
drafting of the UN Guiding Principles:
[c]onflict zones are [ . . . ] problematic because nobody can
claim that the human rights regime, as it is designed, can
possibly function in a situation of extreme duress for the host
state. [Accordingly,] in situations of [armed] conflict,
companies themselves ought to be looking to international
humanitarian law . . . to make sure that they do not find

14. See UN Guiding Principles, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE,
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/big-issues/un-guiding-principles-onbusiness-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/S4GJ-9NX5].
15. Guiding Principles on Bus. & Hum. Rts., U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R OF HUM. RTS.
(2011) https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/Guiding
PrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3PA-92JZ].
16. Protecting and Advancing Freedom of Expression and Privacy in the ICT Sector,
GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/ [https://perma.cc/ED48DSY2] (last visited Jul 6, 2022); UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, The UN
Guiding
Principles
in
the
Age
of
Technology,
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Business/BTech/introduction-ungp-age-technology.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ABZ-4KTV] [hereinafter
UNGP].
17. See IHL and Human Rights, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, War and
Law https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law [https://perma.cc/N8J4-KYUT] (last visited
July 6, 2022); IHL and Human Rights, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, IHL and
Human Rights https://casebook.icrc.org/law/ihl-and-human-rights (last visited Oct. 22,
2022).
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themselves either directly or indirectly contributing to
violating IHL provisions or end up complicit in IHL
violations. 18

Thus, a normative framework does exist in response to the
touchstone question of how an ICT company should conduct itself
in times of war vis-à-vis the actions of belligerent governments. The
rub is that we must look to at least two different bodies of
international law—human rights and humanitarian law—to
understand what that framework consists of, and how it operates
in practice. That is what I propose to do in this Article. Before
proceeding, however, a caveat is in order. The focus of my analysis
is on the legal obligations of States, because, under the UNGP
framework, ICT companies are expected to respect the same
obligations when faced with contrary government demands. 19
However, if “national laws, regulations and policies do not conform
to international standards, ICT companies should avoid, minimize,
or otherwise address the adverse impact of government demands,
laws, or regulations, and seek ways to honor the principles of
internationally recognized [norms] to the greatest extent
possible.” 20 My emphasis on the former point in no way minimizes
the dictates of the latter.
The war in Ukraine has framed a unique set of opportunities
for protecting fundamental human rights and values on the
internet. In late April 2022, soon after the European Union’s
enactment of the DSA, the United States announced that it and sixty
other State “partners” were assuming a series of political
commitments to advance “a positive vision for the Internet in the
18. Vincent Bernard & Mariya Nikolova, Interview with John G. Ruggie, 94 INT. REV. RED
CROSS
891–902,
892-96
(March
2012),
https://internationalreview.icrc.org/articles/intervie w-john-g-ruggie [https://perma.cc/8TTQ-UMZS].
19. See Global Network Initiative, GNI Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy,
GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE 2–3, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/gni-principles/
[https://perma.cc/DP3C-6P4D] (last visited July 8, 2022) (“The duty of governments to
respect, protect, promote and fulfill human rights is the foundation of this human rights
framework.”).
20. Id.
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face of [ . . . ] global challenges presented by the 21st century.”21
This vision expressly includes a commitment to foster and protect
“privacy” and “respect for human rights” online. 22 Christened the
Declaration for the Future of the Internet, this manifesto calls for
participating nations to work towards “a global Internet that
advances the free flow of information” while “respecting each
other’s regulatory autonomy [ . . . ] in accordance with [their]
respective domestic laws and international legal obligations.” 23 In
a response applauding the issuance of the Declaration, Microsoft’s
president, Brad Smith, pointedly raised the armed conflict in
Ukraine as one of those 21st century challenges. He highlighted that
“our generation[‘s]” ability to “act collectively to protect human
rights on the internet” depends on our ability to build upon “one of
the most important advances of the 20th century, the proposition
that governments must protect civilians even in a time of war” in
accordance with the principles of the Fourth Geneva Convention.24
What, then, does international law say to ICT companies
besieged by government requests arising in the context of
international armed conflict? How does a demarcation of
international norms applicable to States during wartime serve to
orient the policies and practices of ICT companies when belligerent
and non-belligerent governments place their demands? Under
what circumstances can international armed conflict justify
government censorship or data access demands that would
otherwise be inconsistent with the States’ obligations under
human rights law? Finally, what legal or normative sources operate
in such situations, and how can ICT companies use them to
evaluate specific government demands during wartime?

21. FACT SHEET: United States and 60 Global Partners Launch Declaration for the
Future of the Internet, (2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2022/04/28/fact-sheet-united-states-and-60-global-partners-launchdeclaration-for-the-future-of-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/937M-9755].
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Brad Smith, A Vital Step at a Critical Moment: The Declaration for the Future of the
Internet, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (2022), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-theissues/2022/04/28/declaration-future-internet-cybersecurity-governance/
[https://perma.cc/8JZD-HKAD], See also infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949,
6
U.S.T.
3516,
75
U.N.T.S.
287,
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.33_GCIV-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQR9-C4AN]; see infra Part II: International Law.
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In this Article, I will address these and related questions to
provide at least preliminary answers to most of them. It is divided
into five Parts. I begin Part II by examining when and how the
relevant bodies of international law apply to and during armed
conflict between States. This second Part introduces the discussion
of a critical issue: the overlap and interplay between the laws of
war and human rights law where both are in effect, with reference
to the situation of Ukraine. In Part III, I take a step back to explain
why ICT companies must engage with IHL before describing how
they can do so. With respect to the latter, I return to the analyses
of “real-world” scenarios arising from the armed conflict in
Ukraine to focus first on Russia, and then on the European Union.
Part III wraps up with an overview of the broader international law
panorama within which all these scenarios are taking place. In Part
IV, I take a deeper dive into more detailed factual scenarios
involving the protection of digital rights in war zones, before
concluding in Part V.
As it turns out, international law provides the parameters
required to responsibly navigate a path between the “rock and a
hard place” this dilemma reflects. Accordingly, this Article does not
just demarcate the landscape of States’ obligations under
international law in times of war with respect to digital rights,
which is a starting point for ICT executives concerned about
enabling government abuses. It also offers normative guidance to
companies as well as other stakeholders operating in the digital
realm when addressing competing demands that impact
fundamental rights from belligerent and non-belligerent parties
alike. One thing this Article will not do is engage with the related
but distinct questions posed by the use of digital technologies to
wage war, specifically through cyber operations that amount to
“attacks” or hostile acts under the laws of armed conflict. 25 Russia’s

25 . See Andy Greenberg, The WIRED Guide to Cyberwar, WIRED (Aug. 23, 2019)
https://www.wired.com/story/cyberwar-guide/,
[https://perma.cc/9BHQ-CRL5];
Jonathan Horowitz, Cyber Operations under International Humanitarian Law: Perspectives
from
the
ICRC,
24
AM.
SOC'Y
INT'L.
L.,
May
19,
2020,
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/11/cyber-operationsunderinternational-humanitarian-law-perspectives-icrc [https://perma.cc/NSA6-PLGY];
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cyber-attacks on Ukraine are indeed relentless. 26 Although very
much a feature of modern “hybrid” warfare, the complex subject of
military cyber operations and their implications for ICT companies
operating in theaters of war is substantively different from the one
addressed in this Article, and has been amply explored
elsewhere. 27 What we are concerned with here is the conduct of
governments relating to information and communications
technologies used during armed conflicts for purposes other than
as means and methods of warfare. 28 I will return to this important
distinction later in the Article.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW

In Ukraine, as in other conflict zones, ICT companies seeking
to adopt a principled position vis-à-vis a given government’s
demands to censor information on the internet or interfere with
privacy rights must first understand what duties international law
imposes on that government. Only then can the company evaluate
whether said demands comport with the State’s legal obligations,
a critical input into the company’s human rights due diligence
calculus. 29 Accordingly, what follows is an abbreviated primer on
the operation and application of international law on armed
conflict between nations. In the Section A of this Part, I examine the
operation of State duties under international human rights law

see also Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Attack’ as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber
Operations Context, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT
283-93 (Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis & Katharina Ziolkowski eds., 2012); Gary Corn,
Cyber National Security: Navigating Gray Zone Challenges In and Through Cyberspace, in
COMPLEX BATTLESPACES: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN WARFARE
(Christopher M. Ford & Winston S. Williams eds., 2018).
26. See Tom Burt, The Hybrid War in Ukraine, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Apr. 27, 2022),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/04/27/hybrid-war-ukraine-russiacyberattacks/ [https://perma.cc/LMA8-YW9Y].
27. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, International Humanitarian
Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting to Protection in
Armed Conflict on the 70th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, 26–29,
https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/challenges-report_newtechnologies-of-warfare.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CX7-GVUY] (last visited July 6, 2022); see
generally Mason Clark, Russian Hybrid Warfare, INST. OF THE STUDY OF WAR (Sept. 2022),
https://www.understandingwar.org/report/russian-hybrid-warfare
[https://perma.cc/SVY2-GJDN].
28. See discussion infra Part III.b.
29. See GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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(“IHRL”) and IHL, as well as how those legal obligations apply to
and in a particular country. In Section B, we will address the
concurrent application of these two bodies of law to better
understand their interplay in theory and practice. While working
through this framework, I will reference the principal treaties and
legal norms of IHRL and IHL in effect for the parties to the armed
conflict in Ukraine and to non-belligerent countries, like those
which comprise the European Union.
A. The Operation of International Law

International law emanates from a limited number of defined
sources that include treaties, which are contractual agreements
negotiated and subscribed to by States, and customary
international law (“CIL”), defined as norms that evidence a general
practice among nations accepted as law. 30 Governments are bound
to comply with their conventional treaty-based and CIL obligations
to respect human rights and humanitarian law. 31 And, as we shall
see in the next two Parts, the obligation of companies in general,
and of ICT companies in particular, is to ensure respect for those
same fundamental norms by not enabling State violations of their
duties under IHRL and IHL, or otherwise being complicit in such
abuses. 32 The starting place in either case is treaty law: what IHL
and IHRL treaties the State in question have ratified and what is
their scope of application?
While the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (“VCLT”)
rules governing treaty ratification and interpretation will apply
30. Public International Law: A Beginner’s Guide—Sources of Law, LIBR. OF CONG. RSCH
GUIDES,
https://guides.loc.gov/public-international-law/sources-of-law
[https://perma.cc/EEZ6-NZ9R] (last visited June 6, 2022); see also Customary
International Humanitarian Law, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010),
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/customary-international-humanitarian-law-0
[https://perma.cc/4XQM-EXZZ].
31 . Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful
Acts,
U.N.
DOC.
A/56/10
art.
2
(2001),
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JHQ7-TED7].
32. See GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, supra note 19 at 2 and accompanying text.
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equally across the board to all treaties, the precise scope of
application of specific treaties will vary depending on their express
terms. 33 This principle is critical to understanding how to navigate
the overlap of IHL and IHRL in situations of armed conflicts.
Broadly speaking, the scope of application of each body of law is
defined by two factors: (1)the ground rules of international law
that apply to treaties, most notably the edict in VCLT Article 26
where “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties [that have
subscribed] to it and must be performed by them in good faith;” 34
and (2) the express terms set out in the treaty itself about the scope
of application. As with any legally binding agreement, treaties must
define, among other things, the subject matter, geographic, and
temporal contours of their application. VCLT Article 31(1)
recognizes this when it states that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.” 35
Take Ukraine as an example. Ukraine is a long-time State Party
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”
or “Covenant”) and the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”);36 it is also a member of the Council of Europe (“COE”).37

33. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S.,
8
I.L.M.
679,
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf[https://p
erma.cc/5DP7-86AR] [hereinafter “VCLT” or “Vienna Convention”].
34. Id. at art. 26.
35. Id. at 31(1).
36. See Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, T.I.A.S. 94-1120, 999
U.N.T.S.
171,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/instrumentsmechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-politicalrights[https://perma.cc/3F8D-F9GH] [hereinafter “ICCPR”]; Eur. Convention for the
Protection of Hum. Rts. and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S.
221, https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3K8YU8F] [hereinafter “ECHR”]; For a list of ratifications, see Depositary Status of Treaties, 4.
Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV4&src=IND [https://perma.cc/6RQP-XRWX](last visited Sep 25, 2022). See also Chart of
Signatures
and
Ratifications
of
Treaty
005,
Council
of
Europe,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list?module=signatures-bytreaty&treatynum=005 [https://perma.cc/KVZ5-MCVH](last visited Sep 25, 2022).
37. Council of Europe: 46 Member States, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en
/web/portal/46-members-states [https://perma.cc/4BEB-RZ9V] (last visited July 6,
2022).
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To simplify the exposition moving forward, I will focus on the
ICCPR with the understanding that the discussion of how that
treaty operates in relation to Ukraine and other States is
representative of those countries’ conventional human rights
obligations more broadly.
The VCLT is clear when it comes to the geographic scope of
treaties in general terms. VCLT Article 29 states that “[u]nless a
different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its
entire territory.” 38 The ICCPR in Article 2(1) expands on this scope
by establishing that a “State Party to the [ . . . ] Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction” all the rights contained
therein. 39 The ICCPR Human Rights Committee expounded on
what is meant by “subject to its jurisdiction;” it said that the
state has an obligation to respect and ensure ICCPR Rights to all
within the “power or effective control” 40 of a state, alluding to a
standard of extraterritorial jurisdiction also adopted by the
European Court of Human Rights. 41 At the same time, it is
important to recognize that ICCPR Article 4 allows State parties
to derogate from all but a handful of rights in a “time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed” provided that such
derogation is “not inconsistent with their other obligations
undern international law and do not involve discrimination . . .
38. VCLT, supra note 33, at art. 29 (emphasis added).
39. ICCPR, supra note 36, at Art. 2(1) ; see also, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 31, THE NATURE
OF THE GENERAL OBLIGATION IMPOSED ON STATES PARTIES TO THE COVENANT,
CCPR/C/21/REV.1/ADD.13 ¶¶ 3 & 10 (2004), https://www.unhcr.org/4963237716.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G74J-U44G] (“[Art.2 (1)] means that a State party must respect and
ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control
of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the state party.”).
40. ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 31, supra note 39.
41. For a summary of this line of jurisprudence, see, Işil Karakaş & Hasan Bakirci,
Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Evolution of the
Court’s Jurisprudence on the Notions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and State Responsibility,
in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018).
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.” 42 Article 4 thus operates to narrow the ICCPR’s scope of
application of human rights protections even further in times of
existential threats to the State Party, as demonstrated by
Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s invasion. 43 We will return to this
key point further below because Ukraine has successfully
derogated from its obligations under the ICCPR in this way. 44
The scope of application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
the primary conventional sources of applicable law to the war in
Ukraine, is qualitatively different. First and foremost, as defined
in Article 2, they will apply “to all cases of declared war or of any
other [international] armed conflict . . . .” 45 The Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
known as Geneva Convention IV (“GC IV”) or the Civilians
Convention, further stipulates that its unique scope of application
applies similarly to “all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance.” 46 Finally, all four Geneva
Conventions specify a category or categories of “protected
persons” over whom they extend their respective safeguards. For
example, Geneva Convention III covers prisoners of war, and is
thus known as the POW Convention, while Geneva Convention I
and II address combatants rendered hors de combat on land and at
42. See infra at note 64 and accompanying text; ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 4(1).
43. See What Happened on Day 8 of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine - Catch Up on the
Latest
News
of
Ukraine,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
3,
2022),
[https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/03/world/russia-ukraine#catch-up-on-thelatest-news-on-ukraine [https://perma.cc/K94W-C9UY]; see also Hum. Rts. Comm.,
General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency (Art. 4), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11
¶ 3 (2001), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/451555?ln=en [https://perma.cc/ED7VJ595](“The [ICCPR] requires that even during an armed conflict measures derogating from
the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to
the life of the nation.”).
44. U.N. Off. of the High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Update on the Human Rights Situation
in
Ukraine,
¶5
(2022),
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/202203/HRMMU_Update_2022-03-26_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SAC-9QFN].
45. Classification of International Armed Conflict, RULAC GENEVA ACAD. (2017)
https://www.rulac.org/classification/international-armed
conflict#:~:text=Common%20Article%202%20to%20the,recognized%20by%20one%2
0of%20them [https://perma.cc/S6RG-Y6JL] (last updated Aug. 30, 2017).
46. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
supra note 24, at art. 2.
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sea, respectively. 47 These protections were expanded and updated
in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts of 1977 known as Protocol I. 48 Ukraine, like Russia, is a
long-standing State Party to the four Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I. 49
In short, international human rights treaties on the one hand,
and those governing the laws of war on the other, each have very
different scopes of application that must be considered separately
when analyzing a scenario of armed conflict on a State party’s
territory. To better understand what that means in practice, look
no further than the war in Ukraine, an international armed conflict
between countries that are subject to the four Geneva Conventions,
Protocol I, and customary international humanitarian law. 50 In
other words, IHL applies by its own terms primarily to the actions
of the belligerents, Russia and Ukraine, the States at war with each
other. 51 More precisely, IHL will apply wherever hostilities are
47 . See Protected Persons, in HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, https://case
book.icrc.org/glossary/protected-persons (last visited Jul 6, 2022). For a brief explanation
of the different Geneva Conventions, see, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their
Additional Protocols, International Committee of the Red Cross, Jan. 1, 2014
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additionalprotocols[https://perma.cc/K346-XJAQ].
48. Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S., 16 I.L.M.
1391,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470
[https://perma.cc/J57T-DED5].
49. See Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries—Ukraine, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS,https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp
?xp_countrySelected=UA [https://perma.cc/U85P-2RWS] (last visited July 8, 2022). (G.C.
Accession: Aug. 3 1954, Add. Pro. I Accession: Jan. 25, 1990); see also Treaties, States
Parties, and Commentaries: Russian Federation, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelec
ted=RU [https://perma.cc/SF8X-PC32] (last visited July 8, 2022). (G.C. Accession: Oct. 5,
1954, Add. Pro. I Accession: Sept. 29, 1989).
50. See Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries - Ukraine, supra note 49; Treaties,
States Parties, and Commentaries: Russian Federation, supra note 49. and accompanying
text.
51. See Belligerency, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/belligerency [https://perma.cc/5NUP-CBUD](last
visited July 6, 2022).
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taking place and/or wherever the “protected persons,” the objects
of IHL’s safeguards, may be. International human rights law,
meanwhile, will apply only in the territory and within the
jurisdiction of State parties, or under a state agent’s effective
control—belligerents or not—and only to the extent that lawful
derogation has not taken place there. 52 In summary, the
application of IHL is dictated more by the stipulated context and
objects of its protections than by geography; IHRL on the other
hand, is bounded strictly by the State Party’s territory and
jurisdiction.
B. The Application of International Law

The foregoing clarifies the nature of Ukraine and Russia’s
obligations under international law so long as the war continues.
But the devil is in the details, especially when IHL and IHRL are
both in effect. Take Ukraine once again as an example. Because
Ukraine is a belligerent, the laws of armed conflict apply fully to the
conduct of hostilities there, as well as any other activities involving
protected persons, such as POWs. 53 At the same time, the human
rights framework emanating from the ICCPR and ECHR that
operates normally in peacetime will continue to be in force
throughout the country’s territory, consistent with the scope of
application of those treaties. 54 In this regard, the only allowance
the ICCPR and ECHR make during wartime is the process of
derogation, discussed in more detail below. 55 The point here is that
so long as the conflict lasts, IHL and IHRL will apply concurrently
throughout Ukrainian territory, raising challenges for ICT

52. See generally Karakas and Bakirci, supra note 41; ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 31, supra
note 39.
53 . International Law on the Conduct of Hostilities: Overview, INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (2010), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/war-andlaw/conduct-hostilities/overview-conduct-ofhostilities.htm#:~:text=International%20law%20on%20the%20conduct%20of%20host
ilities%20regulates%20and%20limits,human%20suffering%2C%20particularly%20am
ong%20civilians [https://perma.cc/Q3SL-38S5].
54. ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 31, supra note 39 at ¶11.
55. See ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 29, supra note 43.
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companies and others seeking to understand what rules pertain to
scenarios arising through war. 56
The concurrent application of IHL and IHRL in times of armed
conflict is a common feature of the different bodies of norms that
comprise international law (international criminal law is the third
body.) 57 But that does not make it any less contentious. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), the recognized
authority in the field of international humanitarian law, described
their interrelation in the following terms:
Where contradictions exist between [IHRL and IHL] rules,
some argue that IHL provisions always prevail, in every
situation for which IHL has a rule or even through its allegedly
qualified silence (e.g., by not referring to the freedom of press
in the law of military occupation). Others, adopting an
International Human Rights Law approach, argue that in any
circumstance the rule providing the greatest level of
protection must be applied. In [the] view of the [ICRC], it is
preferable to adopt a case-by-case approach and to apply the
more detailed rule, that is, that which is more precise vis-à-vis
the situation and the problem to be addressed, be it the rule
emanating from IHL or from International Human Rights
Law. 58

56 . IHL Database - Introduction to Fundamental Guarantees, INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE
OF
THE
RED
CROSS,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_intofugu (last visited Jul 2, 2022); See also UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONFLICT, HR/PUB/11/01, 55–58 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/
Documents /Publications/HR_in_armed_conflict.pd [https://perma.cc/HLL7-ZAEX].
57 . See also International Law Applicable to Situations of Armed Conflict, RULAC
GENEVA ACAD. (2017), https://www.rulac.org/legal-framework [https://perma.cc/6RY2M7U7](last updated Jan. 13, 2017).
58. IHL and Human Rights, Rights Protected by Both Branches: The Lex Specialis, ICRC
CASEBOOK - HOW DOES THE LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, https://casebook.icrc.org/law/ihl-andhuman-rights [https://perma.cc/YP9K-WHD9](last visited July 29, 2022); see also U.N.
OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 44; see also Marko Milanovic, The Lost
Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship Between Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUM.
RTS. 38, 5 (2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463957
[https://perma.cc/NX52-XM4K].
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The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, which
oversees implementation of the ICCPR, has similarly observed that
“[d]uring armed conflict, whether international or noninternational, rules of international humanitarian law become
applicable and help [ . . . ] to prevent the abuse of a State’s
emergency powers.” 59 Lest there be any doubt, the Committee
understands that “the Covenant applies also in situations of armed
conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are
applicable.” 60 It further affirmed that while “more specific rules of
international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the
purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of
law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.” 61 Moreover,
where emergency measures under ICCPR Article 4 are invoked, “no
[such] measure derogating from the provisions of the Covenant
may be inconsistent with the State party’s other obligations under
international law, particularly the rules of international
humanitarian law.” 62
So what does the concurrent and “complementary”
application of IHL and IHRL mean in practice? The challenge is
deciphering when as well as what rules of decision from one body
of law will apply in a particular scenario rather than those of the
other, given that both sets of norms are equally in effect. Navigating
the nodal question of what rules of IHL will prevail over those of
IHRL in the context of armed conflict depends on the outcome of
three fact-specific inquiries fixed by international law. The first is
whether the armed conflict is of an international or noninternational character, because the instruments, norms and
dynamics of IHL that will apply to each are different. 63 The second

59. ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 29, supra note 43 at ¶ 3.
60. ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 31, supra note 39 at ¶11.
61. Id.
62. ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 29, supra note 43 at ¶ 9; id., at ¶11 (“States parties may in
no circumstances invoke article 4 of the Covenant as justification for acting in violation of
humanitarian law [ . . . ], for instance by taking hostages, by imposing collective
punishments, through arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviating from fundamental
principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence.”).
63. E4J University Module Series: Counter-Terrorism - Module 6: Military / Armed
Conflict Approaches to Countering Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
(2018), https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/terrorism/module-6/key-issues/categorizationof-armed-conflict.html [https://perma.cc/483M-7YF7]. IHL, codified primarily in the
Geneva Conventions and customary law after the Second World War, was primarily
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question asks whether there has been a legitimate derogation from
the relevant human rights treaties in effect. 64 The third inquiry is
that of the lex specialis (the “special” law), meaning which of the
applicable legal norms is more precise in context and thus better
suited to the particular scenario addressed. 65 By working through
these threshold issues in the context of the Ukrainian armed
conflict, we can begin to see how each body of law is utilized in
practice.
As a consequence of the international armed conflict triggered
by Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has lawfully
derogated from both the ICCPR and the ECHR under the respective
treaty’s provisions authorizing State parties to do so. I highlighted
already the significance of derogation: it is the process through
which States may legitimately suspend a number of their legal
obligations under the respective treaty, thus drastically reducing
its scope of protection to a handful of pre-defined “non-derogable”
rights. 66 In the case of Ukraine’s derogation under ICCPR Article 4
for example, this means that the main treaty protections left in
force are the rights to life (Article 6), juridical personality (Article
designed to address international armed conflict (conflict between states.) In the decades
since, non-international armed conflicts, those involving conflict between “organized nonstate armed groups” and a State, have become more common. The law addressing these
types of conflict is more limited: Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II, and customary
IHL govern NIAC’s. When Does IHL Apply?, ICRC BLOG (June 13, 2017),
https://blogs.icrc.org/ilot/2017/08/13/when-does-ihl-apply/ [https://perma.cc/J6TJASM9].
64. Derogations, in ICRC CASEBOOK—HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR, https://caseb
ook.icrc.org/glossary/derogations [https://perma.cc/M2GP-ASLT] (last visited July 6,
2022). Human rights law applies at all times except where derogations are permitted in a
“state of emergency.” For example, the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion
in Nuclear Weapons recognized that: “The protection of the [ICCPR] does not cease in times
of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may
be derogated from in a time of national emergency.” Legality of the Threat of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ 226, ¶ 25 (July 8), https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule7 [https://perma.cc/9YEB-994C]
[hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
65. Lex Specialis, in ICRC CASEBOOK - HOW DOES THE LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, https://
casebook.icrc.org/glossary/lex-specialis [https://perma.cc/AST3-NGD4] (last visited July
6, 2022).
66. See id. and accompanying text.
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16), and to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article
18), together with the prohibitions on torture (Article 7), slavery
(Article 8), debt bondage (Article 11), and ex post facto laws
(Article 15). 67 In addition, international law recognizes that fair
trial and other basic due process guarantees must also remain in
effect to ensure the safeguarding of the non-derogable rights. 68
As the UN Human Rights Committee recognized, derogation
leaves a normative vacuum of sorts for IHL to fill as per the terms
of its more specialized conventional and customary law
framework. 69 Here, the upshot of Ukraine’s derogation under
ICCPR Article 4 is that it can enact substantial restrictions on
freedom of expression and privacy rights in its territory, even
onerous ones, so long as said restrictions conform to the exigencies
of the dire situation and are not patently arbitrary or
discriminatory. 70 It could conceivably adopt measures that would
otherwise violate the dictates of ICCPR Article 20, such as
disseminating war propaganda so long as they did not contravene
an applicable IHL principle or rule. But what of those core human
rights protections that remain in effect in Ukraine even after
derogation? What happens in situations of armed conflict where
the State cannot or chooses not to derogate from its human rights
obligations? These are the scenarios in which the concurrent
application of IHL and IHRL will require an inquiry into the lex
specialis.
An illustration of how lex specialis works in the Ukrainian
context is provided by Article 15 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (“ECHR”), which prescribes that treaty’s derogation
regime. Paragraph 1 of Article 15 affirms that in “time of war or
67. ICCPR, supra note 36, at arts. 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, 18.
68. Id. at art. 4(1).
See also, ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 29, supra note 43 at ¶¶ 8, 13, 15, and 16.
(“As certain elements of the right to a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed under
international humanitarian law during armed conflict, the Committee finds no justification
for derogation from these guarantees during other emergency situations.”).
69. ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 29, supra note 43, at ¶9.
70. Id. at ¶ 16 (“Safeguards related to derogation [ . . . ] are based on the principles of
legality and the rule of law inherent in the Covenant as a whole.”); id. at ¶8 (“According to
article 4, paragraph 1, one of the conditions for the justifiability of any derogation from the
covenant is that the measures taken do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of
race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin.”). See discussion infra at notes 148-66
and accompanying text.; see also ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 29, supra note 43, ¶3.
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other public emergency threatening the life of the nation” any State
party can derogate from its obligations under the Convention. A
notable exception is made in Paragraph 2, which states that there
can be “[n]o derogation from [the right to life], except in respect of
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war.” 71 The only other express
exceptions made are for the prohibitions on torture, slavery and ex
post facto laws. 72 The ECHR in this way both recognizes the
primacy of IHL with respect to the otherwise non-derogable right
to life in a time of war, and incorporates it as the lex specialis. This
approach similarly holds true for obligations under other IHRL
treaties such as the ICCPR, as recognized by the International Court
of Justice(“ICJ”). 73 In its advisory opinion, The Legality of the Threat
of Nuclear Weapons (“Nuclear Weapons”), the ICJ analyzed the
interplay between IHL and IHRL with respect to the non-derogable
human right to not be arbitrarily deprived of life. 74 It concluded
that “the test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life [ . . . ] falls to
be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law
applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the
conduct of hostilities.” 75
III. ARMED CONFLICT

Understanding when and how IHRL and IHL apply to armed
conflict is not the end of our analysis but rather the beginning. It is
the starting point for exploring “real-world” scenarios in which ICT
companies confront competing government demands from
belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The international law
regime described in Part II permits us to discern which set of rules
will govern a State’s conduct in varying conditions, providing the
appropriate normative reference-markers for companies facing
such demands. It confirms that international armed conflicts can,
under certain circumstances, justify a belligerent government’s
censorship and data requests in its own territory where hostilities
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

ECHR, supra note 36, at art. 15(2) (emphasis added).
Id. at arts. 3, 4, 7(1).
IHL Database—Introduction to Fundamental Guarantees, supra note 56.
Id.
Nuclear Weapons, supra note 64, at § 240.
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are taking place, even if those demands would otherwise be
inconsistent with applicable human rights law. This is especially
true where a State like Ukraine has derogated lawfully from its
human rights obligations in wartime. Under those circumstances,
the “conflict” between IHL and IHRL becomes largely non-existent
or minimal in practice. 76 In that scenario, as in Ukraine today, the
IHL is presumed to predominate in most cases.
But the question begged here is this: should technology
companies be engaging in the analysis of IHL at all? Is not reliance
on the more familiar models already developed pursuant to the UN
General Principles on Business and Human Rights sufficient to do
the job adequately? The disorientation of ICT company executives
and Business and Human Rights (“BHR”) officers facing
government demands during an international armed conflict is
understandable. 77 But the fact remains that even under the UNGP
model itself, they, like the governments they interface with, are
subject to a different set of relevant international law norms than
just human rights when operating in and around theaters of war,
namely, IHL. 78 Whether in Ukraine, Russia, or anywhere else in the
world where armed conflict exists, the basic tenet of the UNGP
model expects companies to respect and promote “international
standards” relating to human rights in their interactions with
governments. 79 Given the affinity in principles and purpose that
inheres within these two overlapping bodies of law, 80 the UNGP’s
operating premise holds equally true where the relevant standards
emanate from IHL as when they come from IHRL. This in turn
requires developing new analytical pathways to determine what
the applicable standards are in the context of armed conflict,
especially internationally. 81
Fortunately, as Part II shows, such pathways do exist; they
require only deliberate development from within the general
UNGP framework already in place and adaptation to the challenges

76. See infra Part IV.
77. Bernard and Nikolova, supra note 18, at 892.
78. See UNGP, supra note 16.
79. See GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, supra note 19, at 2; UNGP, supra note 16.
80. See supra note 18, and accompanying text; see also infra note 166 and
accompanying text.
81. Virtual in-person Interview with Jennifer Easterday, JustPeace Labs (June 14,
2022).

78

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:1

faced by technology companies specifically. 82 Otherwise, ICT
companies would be unable to fulfill their duty fixed by that
framework to hold governments to their international obligations
when making demands or enacting laws and regulations impacting
digital rights, and to “seek ways to honor the principles of
internationally recognized human rights to the greatest extent
possible.” 83 As a rule, business executives from any sector dealing
with potential or actual armed conflict will assess “whether [they]
have people at risk, operations that might be affected, or supply
chains that might be interrupted[,]” as well as any exposure to
cyber-attacks. 84 To that list of due diligence to-dos, executives
must now add the responsibility to ensure they do not make
decisions that enable, aid and abet, or otherwise establish
complicity in the commission of war crimes and other violations of
international law by belligerents. 85 ICT companies are no
exception; in fact, given their nodal role in the digital age, such
companies are increasingly being held “accountable not only to
their users but to society at large.” 86
To help discern the pathways possible in this respect, the
remainder of Part III is divided into two sections, which build on
the foundation laid in Part II to analyze the “real-world” examples
referenced in the Introduction of government demands arising in
the context of the Ukraine conflict. 87 In Section A, I discuss the
appropriate perspectives for analyzing Russian government
conduct with respect to that conflict and then contrast those with

82. See infra Part IV.B.
83. GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, supra note 19, at 2.
84. Paul R. Kolbe et al., The Cybersecurity Risks of an Escalating Russia-Ukraine Conflict,
HARV. BUS. REV.: CYBERSECURITY & DIGITAL PRIVACY (2022), https://hbr.org/2022/02/thecybersecurity-risks-of-an-escalating-russia-ukraine-conflict
[https://perma.cc/TVP767JH].
85. Bernard & Nikolova supra note 18 and accompanying text; see e.g. UN Guiding
Principles, supra note 14, at 19–20; Ethical Principles Guiding the ICRC’s Partnerships with
the Private Sector, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Mar. 10, 2018),
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ethical-principles-guiding-icrc-partnershipsprivate-sector [https://perma.cc/26UJ-DDVB].
86. Irene Khan (UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion),
Disinformation and freedom of opinion and expression ¶ 95, A/HRC/47/25 (Apr. 13 2021).
87. See supra Part I Introductory discussion; See also Satariano & Frenkel supra notes
1, 18-19 and accompanying text (Russian, Ukraine, and EU examples).
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related actions taken by the European Union. In Section B, I step
back to examine the broader international legal framework upon
which the aforementioned events are taking place and how it
shapes analysis of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict in particular. To
do so I focus on recent developments in international legal process
as applied to the ICT sector and international security generally.
The main goal of Part III is to set the stage for a more in-depth study
in Part IV of how the two bodies of international law—IHRL and
especially IHL—interact in the context of international armed
conflict, and how technology companies can adapt their business
and human rights assessment models to incorporate it.
A. The Russian-Ukrainian Armed Conflict

In Part II, I discussed in some detail the situation of Ukraine
regarding the operation of IHL and IHRL in that country. Let us
now examine in similar fashion the nature and extent of Russia’s
obligations after its invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Significantly,
the corresponding panorama of legal obligations for Russia is quite
different from that of Ukraine’s outlined above, a fact which has
important repercussions for the analysis of government and ICT
companies’ responses to Russian propaganda, disinformation, and
cyber operations in the region.
To begin, we must differentiate between Russian territory
proper, and that which it controls or disputes through conquest in
Ukraine. Let us focus first on the latter. For the most part, the
conduct of hostilities following the invasion has been confined to
the territory of Ukraine, with most of the fighting concentrated in
disputed areas along the Russian border to the east and south,
especially in the Donbas region, which at the time of this writing
was close to being fully occupied. 88 It is evident that Russia must
adhere to the laws of war in the context of these hostilities, as well
as in relation to protected persons, such as POWs, wherever they
are (i.e., in Ukraine or Russia). In particular, Russia is bound to
comply with the dictates of Geneva Convention IV, Protocol I and
88. The Visual Journalism Team, Ukraine War in Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion,
BBC NEWS (July 4, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682
[https://perma.cc/5FR3-TUA7] (At the time of this writing, Donbas was close to being
fully occupied).
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the customary IHL norms applicable to occupied territories in
those areas of Ukrainian territory under its control. 89 This is true
regardless of whether it respects its obligations or flaunts them
when Russian forces deliberately commits war crimes to advance
their strategic objectives. 90 The question of whether Russia’s IHRL
duties outlined below extend to the occupied zones, to supplement
the baseline IHL guarantees for protected persons there, is an open
one in theory. 91 In practice, however, it seems quixotic at best, for
reasons later explained. 92
A very different scenario plays out in Russia proper where the
applicable normative framework is concerned. Given the general
absence of hostilities in that country to date, Russia is bound first
and foremost to respect human rights law fully vis-à-vis all persons
within its territory, unless it were to derogate from the operable

89 . See Natia Kalandarishvili-Mueller, Russia’s “Occupation by Proxy” of Eastern
Ukraine—Implications
Under
the
Geneva
Conventions,
(2022),
https://www.justsecurity.org/80314/russias-occupation-by-proxy-of-eastern-ukraineimplications-under-the-geneva-conventions/ [https://perma.cc/UUR7-UVEW]; The
following discussion of effective control vs. overall control standards, and grave breaches
regime as they apply to occupied territory by government or proxy forces] – “Russia has
to fully abide by the international humanitarian law of military occupation in this
particular situation. More specifically, Geneva Convention IV should be applicable to the
actions of the Russian backed separatists, along with other rules of international
humanitarian law. All are also bound by the application of human rights law, applicable to
all the warring parties.”); see also, What Happened on Day 74 of the War in Ukraine, N.Y.
TIMES (May 8, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/05/08/world/ukrainerussia-war-news?smid=url-copy#russia-tightens-its-control-over-occupied-ukraine
[https://perma.cc/KM2K-T3XG].
90 . See Ukraine: Apparent War Crimes in Russia-Controlled Areas—Summary
Executions, Other Grave Abuses by Russian Forces, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 3, 2022),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russiacontrolled-areas [https://perma.cc/C8BS-GNZF]; Russian War Crimes in Ukraine: EU
Supports the International Criminal Court Investigation with €7.25 Million, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE,
PRESS
RELEASE,
June
8,
2022,
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3543
[https://perma.cc/A6WZ-UKDT]; One Killing Among Many in a Kyiv Suburb: The Story of a
Summary
Execution
in
Bucha,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Apr.
5,
2022),
https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/04/05/one-killing-among-many-in-a-kyivsuburb [https://perma.cc/86WG-EAX5].
91. See RULAC GENEVA ACAD., supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also infra
notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
92. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.

2022]

ICT COMPANIES IN ARMED CONFLICT

81

IHRL treaties. 93 For example, even if Russia were to seek it, which
does not appear to be the case, a valid derogation under the ICCPR
is unlikely given the present lack of an apparent existential threat
to the nation. 94 This is especially important in light of the
astonishing fact that Russia was expelled from the Council of
Europe in March 2022, and as a result will cease to be an active
State party to the European Convention on Human Rights starting
in September 2022. 95 That fact notwithstanding, Russia would
nonetheless remain bound by IHRL obligations at home and in any
place it controls, such as occupied territories in Ukraine, when IHL
does not otherwise operate as lex specialis. 96 Even after it ceases to
be subject to the dictates of the ECHR, Russia will still be subject to
the full panoply of protections prescribed by the ICCPR until it
lawfully derogates from them or withdraws from the treaty. 97
Hence, in May 2022, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
freedom of opinion and expression and her colleagues from other
regional human rights systems issued a Joint Statement
collectively condemning Russia’s censorship and disinformation
campaigns at home. 98 In their statement, these international
experts expressed their deepening alarm at:
93. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
94. See ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 29, supra note 43, at ¶ 3.
95. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Laurence Helfer, Russia and the European Human
Rights System: Doing the Right Thing . . . but for the Right Legal Reason?, EJIL: TALK! (Mar.
29, 2022), https://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-and-the-european-human-rights-systemdoing-the-right-thing-but-for-the-right-legalreason/#:~:text=On%2016%20March%202022%2C%20the,on%20Human%20Rights%
20(ECHR) [https://perma.cc/8A6U-2V3H].
96. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text; see also ICCPR GEN. COMM. NO. 31,
supra note 39, at ¶ 3.
97. Even if Russia were to withdraw from the ICCPR, it would still be bound by
customary international law and basic human rights protections it recognizes. See,
GENERAL COMMENT NO. 26: CONTINUITY OF OBLIGATIONS, CCPR/C/21/REV.1/ADD.8/REV.1 ¶ 1
(1997), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/249474?ln=en [https://perma.cc/2JYBVYCV] (“Consequently, the possibility of termination, denunciation or withdrawal must be
considered in light of applicable rules of customary international law which are reflected
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”).
98. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS Ukraine: Joint
Statement on Russia’s Invasion and Importance of Freedom of Expression and
Information,
(May
4,
2022),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-andspeeches/2022/05/ukraine-joint-statement-russias-invasion-and-importance-freedom
[https://perma.cc/CB65-L9ZV].
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[ . . . ] the [ . . . ] tightening of censorship and repression of
dissent and pluralist sources of information and opinion in the
Russian Federation, including the blocking of social media
platforms and news websites, [and] disruption of services
from foreign content and service providers [ . . . ]. We call on
the Russian government to fully implement its international
human rights obligations, including by respecting, promoting
and protecting the freedom to seek, receive and impart
information regardless of frontiers, and by ensuring a safe
working environment for independent media, journalists and
civil society actors. 99

It is worth noting that, in their pronouncement, these experts
referenced those incidents, raised in the Introduction, of Russia
pressuring technology companies to censor social media posts and
other information inside the country on platforms like Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter. 100 At the same time, they are similarly
denouncing as unlawful under IHRL the related measures that
were already in place restricting domestic access to those same
sites and others, for undermining freedom of expression in Russian
territory. 101
Having mapped the situation under international law
prevailing with respect to the belligerent States, Russia and
Ukraine, only one question remains: what legal parameters apply
to non-belligerent countries that take actions motivated by the
armed conflict between the two countries, like those adopted by
the European Union? In March 2022, in a precursor action to the
enactment of the Digital Service Act’s “crisis mechanism,” 102 the
Council of the European Union unanimously passed Regulation
2022/350 banning the transmission of content from two Russian
television stations with strong links to the Kremlin over any
99. Id (emphasis added).
100. See Milmo, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
101. Ukraine: Joint Statement on Russia’s Invasion and Importance of Freedom of
Expression and Information, supra note 98.
102. Meaker, supra note 2.
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media. 103 The European Council’s resolution denounced Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine and the country’s “concerted [pro-war]
propaganda actions targeted at civil society in the [European]
Union [which] constitute a significant and direct threat to the
Union’s public order and security.” 104 The European Union
described the two Russian media outlets as “essential and
instrumental” in disseminating Russian state propaganda and
disinformation directed at EU countries to gather support of its
“illegal military actions” in Ukraine. 105
The European Union anchored its stated legal basis for
censoring the two Russian media outlets inter alia in its common
foreign and security policy rules. 106 What is interesting, however,
is the express verdict of all twenty-seven EU member States that
the enactment of Regulation 2022/350—an unprecedented,
momentous and sweeping action to be sure—harmonized with
their individual and collective human rights obligations:
In view of the gravity of the situation, and in response to
Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, it is
necessary, consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms
recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular
with the right to freedom of expression and information as
recognised in Article 11 thereof, to introduce [these] restrictive
measures to urgently suspend the broadcasting activities of
such media outlets in the [European] Union, or directed at the
Union. 107

What these EU governments were saying—including those of
human-rights champions like Estonia, Finland, Netherlands, and
Sweden—is that they believed the restrictive measures imposed
by the Regulation met “the three-part test of legality, legitimate
aim, and necessity and proportionality” required by international
human rights law, as reflected in ICCPR article 19(3). 108 With

103. COUNCIL REG. (EU) 2022/350 OF 1 MAR. 2022 AMENDING REG. (EU) NO 833/2014
CONCERNING RESTRICTIVE MEASURES OF RUSSIA’S ACTIONS DESTABILISING THE SITUATION IN
UKRAINE, REG. (EU) 2022/350 (2022), [https://perma.cc/8NG2-QQCJ].

104. Id. at ¶ 7.
105. Id. at ¶ 9.
106. Lomas, supra note 4.
107. REG. (EU) 2022/350, supra note 103 at ¶10 (emphasis added).
108. Ukraine: Joint Statement on Russia’s Invasion and Importance of Freedom of
Expression and Information, supra note 98; ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 19(3); see also
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respect to the critical third prong of this test—that the restrictions
must be proportionate to the problem addressed—the EU officials
stressed that they were targeting only the two most prominent and
clearly attributable outlets used by the Russian state to wage its
widespread disinformation campaigns, and only for the duration
of the Ukrainian conflict. 109 Indeed, the organic connection
between the TV stations targeted and Kremlin had been welldocumented, bolstering the validity of the European Union’s
action. 110
Naturally, not everyone agreed. In their May 2022 joint
statement, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression
and her regional colleagues expressed concern that “the [European
Union]’s decision to ban two Russian state-owned media outlets
may have been a disproportionate response to disinformation.”111
In their view, “[p]romoting access to diverse and verifiable
information, including ensuring access to free, independent and
pluralistic media, is a more effective response to
disinformation.” 112 Be that as it may, there seems to be no dispute
that the European Union’s weighty aim was legitimate under the
circumstances, or that legal process was pursued to advance it
though some have taken issue with it. 113 As for the sanctions

European Court Of Justice, PRESS RELEASE No 132/22: Case T-125/22 RT France v Council
(July 27, 2022) https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/202207/cp220132en.pdf [https://perma.cc/GUM5-AHTC] (announcing the Court of Justice of
the European Union’s judgment affirming the lawfulness of the European Union’s
sanctions).
109. Lomas, supra note 4.
110. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE - GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER, GEC Special Report Kremlin-funded Media: RT and Sputnik’s Role in Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda
Ecosystem,
(2022),https://www.state.gov/report-rt-and-sputniks-role-in-russiasdisinformation-and-propaganda-ecosystem/ [https://perma.cc/Y3W8-HZDR];“Russia’s
aggression against Ukraine: EU adopts ‘maintenance and alignment’ package,” Consilium ,
July
21,
2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2022/07/21/russia-s-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-maintenance-andalignment-package/ [https://perma.cc/9KUB-SVL7].
111. Ukraine: Joint Statement on Russia’s Invasion and Importance of Freedom of
Expression and Information, supra note 98.
112. Id.
113. The author participated in a Chatham House virtual discussion on May 13, 2022,
convened by the Annenberg Public Policy Center, of the University of Pennsylvania,
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themselves, when contrasted with the Kremlin’s iron-fisted
repression and blocking of all independent media inside Russia
and its controlled territories, 114 the focused restrictions enacted
by the European Union in its Regulation seem to pale by
comparison, making it harder to argue against them. 115 The only
thing that is certain is that this debate will continue to take place
exclusively within a human rights framework, with the armed
conflict in Ukraine functioning primarily as context and as a critical
source of factual inputs for the analysis of government restraints
imposed on freedom of expression under the established “threepart test” in IHRL. 116
B. International Law, Cyberspace and Armed Conflict

Up to this point, I have centered our discussion on mapping
the parameters of IHL and IHRL incumbent upon the main actors
in the international armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia,
beginning with the belligerents. In Part IV below, I will take specific
IHL principles and norms and apply them to a series of detailed
factual scenarios involving digital rights that have arisen, or might
arise, from the war in Ukraine. In this final section of Part III,
however, I want to step back and reference the broader legal
framework with a focus on recent developments in the evolution
of international law on global security in cyberspace. This exercise
will provide a more comprehensive toolkit for the analysis of the
issues at hand and to better see the normative contours and limits
of IHL and IHRL in armed conflicts. Finally, it will facilitate the next
step of isolating the primary principles and rules prescribed by
entitled “To Bend or Ban: How should Online Platforms and Services Respond to Armed
Conflicts?” Several panelists raised concerns about Regulation 2022/350, including
questions about the legitimacy of the “legal process.”
114 . The Stalinisation of Russia: As it Sinks in that he Cannot Win in Ukraine,
Vladimir Putin is Resorting to Repression at Home, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 12, 2022),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/03/12/the-stalinisation-of-russia
[https://perma.cc/ZPR4-MGXR].
115. Vivek Krishnamurthy, Putin’s Illegal War Has Gotten an Easy Ride from Big Tech,
CENTER
FOR
INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION
(2022),
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/putins-illegal-war-has-so-far-gotten-an-easy-ridefrom-big-tech/ [https://perma.cc/UD6W-C554].
116. See, e.g., GNI Statement: E.U. Sanctions on Russian Broadcasters (Aug. 2022),
available
at
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/eu-sanctions-russia-ukraine-foe/
[https://perma.cc/9L6P-U8KD].

86

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:1

those bodies of law to analyze in Part IV their implementation by
States and business actors—technology companies primarily—
with whom they interact under the UNGP framework.
To help properly focus the inquiry advanced in this section, I
want first to highlight the factual scenarios which are its ultimate
target, including the controversial State practices already
described. 117 In short, what concerns us is the conduct of
governments regarding, or in relation to, ICTs used during armed
conflicts for purposes other than means and methods of warfare,
such as “cyber-attacks.” 118 For reasons of relevance and
practicality, cyber-warfare per se has been excluded from our
immediate purview. 119 Instead, we are talking about actions that
include cyber-enabled information operations of “influence,” 120
such as directed campaigns to spread misinformation and
disinformation. 121 These operations similarly encompass all types
of State propaganda that is disseminated or retransmitted online,
which like disinformation, is actively amplified through social
media. 122 Similarly, governments are using digital technologies to
enable “unprecedented levels” of surveillance of civilians with realworld repercussions such as arrest and detention. 123 At the same
time, they may present demands to ICT companies for access to
personal and other data, further undermining privacy rights. 124
They may even bypass the companies to gain direct access to such
data. 125 Last but not least, States act or seek to restrict, block or
117. See supra discussion in Introduction.
118. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 27, at 26–29; see also,
supra Introduction, discussion on means and methods of war and demarcation; see also,
Horowitz, supra note 25;. see also, MICROSOFT - DIGITAL SECURITY UNIT, Special Report:
Ukraine - An Overview of Russia’s Cyberattack Activity in Ukraine, (2022),
https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE4Vwwd
[https://perma.cc/EBR8-6TWU].
119. See supra Introduction, note 138.
120. MICROSOFT - DIGITAL SECURITY UNIT, supra note 118, at 15.
121. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 27, at 26–29.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See infra Part IV.B.
125. See, Global Network Initiative, Defining Direct Access,
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/defining-direct-access-2/#:~:text=Join%20GNI-
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otherwise censor certain online content their government deems
offensive or counter to its interests. 126
Despite increasing State practices of this nature, international
law has been slow to recognize, much less address, the threats they
pose. To be clear, “IHL does not necessarily prohibit such activities
[unless they] adversely affect civilian populations.” 127 However, it
is of great concern to many, and the gravamen of this Article, that
the aforementioned types of government conduct, when taken in
the context of armed conflict, can leverage “the greater scope and
force-multiplying effect provided by digital technology [to]
exacerbate—and add to—the existing vulnerabilities of persons
affected by armed conflicts.” 128 For this reason, the United Nations’
entity charged with studying “how international law applies to the
use of information and communications technologies by States,” 129
established in 2004, finally recognized in 2021 that “international
humanitarian law [ . . . ] applies to cyber-operations during an
armed conflict[.]” 130 Although this landmark acknowledgment
comes heavily qualified 131 and speaks mostly to governments’
conduct of hostilities in and through cyberspace, it nonetheless
portends a normative shift towards recognizing that traditional
IHL protections for civilians and “civilian objects” will extend to the
actions of belligerents taken through, or in relation to, ICTs. 132 I
will say more about how these protections relate to the questions
further below.
The UN body spearheading these efforts is the “Group of
Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in
,Defining%20Direct%20Access%3A%20GNI%20calls%20for%20greater%20transparen
cy%20and%20dialogue,to%20voice%20and%20data%20communications
[https://perma.cc/YG6H-URRL] (last visited July 6, 2022).
126. See, e.g., Satariano, supra note 9; see also Milmo, supra note 8.
127. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 27, at 29.
128. Id. at 28.
129 . G.A. Res. 73/266, ¶ 3 (Jan. 2, 2019), https://undocs.org/A/RES/73/266
(establishing the 2019-2021 GGE).
130 . Michael Schmitt, The Sixth United Nations GGE and International Law in
Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/76864/the-sixth-unitednations-gge-and-international-law-in-cyberspace/ [https://perma.cc/8736-CYDQ].
131. Id.
132. See id. (Noting the open question of whether “data is an ‘object’” such that an
operation that targets civilian data for destruction or deletion violates IHL.).
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Cyberspace in the Context of International Security” (“GCE”). 133
The GGE’s groundbreaking 2021 report built on a series of
foundational principles it adopted in an earlier report from
2015; 134 taken together, these pronouncements framed the
discussion of how IHL and IHRL should be construed in any cyberrelated setting to which they apply. 135 The first of the 2015
principles, reaffirmed by the GGE in 2021, stated that “State
sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from
sovereignty apply to the conduct by States of ICT-related activities
and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their
territory.” 136 It acknowledged that “States exercise jurisdiction
over the ICT infrastructure [by] setting policy and law and
establishing the necessary mechanisms to protect ICT
infrastructure on their territory from ICT-related threats.” 137
Similarly, the GGE in 2021 reaffirmed its earlier explanation that
“[e]xisting obligations under international law are [equally]
applicable to States’ ICT-related activity.” 138 The latter principle is
especially important to the current study because it recognizes
that States’ exercise of their sovereign prerogatives will be bound
133. Id.
134. Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State
Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security, transmitted by Letter
dated 28 May 2021 from the Chair of the Group Established Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of
General Assembly Resolution 73/266 Addressed to the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 2-3, U.N.
Doc.
A/76/135
(July
14,
2021),
https://front.un-arm.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/final-report-2019-2021-gge-1-advance-copy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HYX2-SCV8] [hereinafter GGE 2019-2021 Report]; Rep. of the Group of
Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, transmitted by Letter dated
26 June 2015 from the Chair of the Group Established Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General
Assembly Resolution 68/243 Addressed to the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 2-3, U.N. Doc.
A/70/174
(July
22,
2015),
https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/228/35/PDF/N1522835.pdf?OpenElement
[https://perma.cc/P95Q-SXAJ] [hereinafter GGE 2015 Report].
135. Schmitt, supra note 130.
136. GGE 2015 Report, supra note 134, at ¶ 27; GGE 2019-2021 Report, supra note
135, at ¶ 71(b).
137. GGE 2019-2021 REPORT, supra note 134, at ¶ 71(b).
138. GGE 2015 Report, supra note 134, at ¶ 28(b); GGE 2019-2021 Report, supra note
136, at ¶ 71(b).
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by legal duties, inter alia, to “respect and protect the human rights
of individuals over whom they exercise control.” 139
The door was thus open for the GGE in 2021 to take the next
logical step of affirming what most observers already knew to be
true: that IHL plays a similar, limiting role in situations of armed
conflict using or involving digital technologies. 140 In 2015, the GGE
had gone so far as to acknowledge the operation in cyber-space of
“established international legal principles [that apply to the use of
ICTs by States], including [ . . . ] the principles of humanity,
necessity, proportionality, and distinction,” 141 but stopped short of
naming IHL specifically. Its 2021 report, however, not only
reiterated these principles, but also integrated them with the GGE’s
express recognition of “international humanitarian law” as the
context in which those four principles apply, thereby providing “an
additional layer of understanding” to guide their further
exploration and implementation. 142 Connecting the two concepts
in this way moved the normative ball forward significantly. 143 Lest
there be any doubt as to what the GGE intended, it highlighted “the
need for further study on how and when these [IHL] principles
apply to the use of ICTs by States[.]” 144 Before proceeding in Part
IV to do just that, it behooves us to first review what each of the
aforementioned legal principles means, beginning with the
“cornerstone” principle of distinction. 145
The principle of distinction requires parties to an armed
conflict to distinguish between combatants and civilians, as well as
between military and civilian objects. 146 A cardinal rule of IHL is
that civilians must be distinguished from combatants, for the
simple reason that “[o]ne must know who and what may be
targeted and who and what may not, and what protection to afford

130.

139. Schmitt, supra note 130.
140. Id.
141. GGE 2015 REPORT, supra note 134, at ¶28(d).
142. Id. at ¶71(f); see also Schmitt, supra note 130.
143. Schmitt, supra note 130.
144. GGE 2019-2021 REPORT, supra note 134, at ¶ 71(f); see also, Schmitt, supra note

145. Marco Sassóli, et al., Principle of Distinction, in HOW DOES THE LAW PROTECT IN
WAR?, https://casebook.icrc.org/law/principle-distinction (2014) (ebook).
146. International Humanitarian Law, RULAC GENEVA ACAD.,
https://www.rulac.org/legal-framework/international-humanitarianlaw#collapse3accord [https://perma.cc/R3SH-QVSB] (last visited July 6, 2022).
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depending on the category which a person belongs to.” 147 Civilians
by definition are non-combatants, because they do not take a direct
part in the hostilities, and must therefore be given the granted the
highest level of protection afforded by IHL. 148 They cannot be
directly targeted by belligerents in the conduct of hostilities. 149
Additional protections under both IHL and IHRL will also
apply in certain circumstances, such as the military occupation of
territories. 150 A parallel set of proscriptions operate with respect
to civilian objects, which must be distinguished from military
objectives. 151 International law is clear: “[a]ttacks may only be
directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed
against civilian objects”. 152 The International Court of Justice in
Nuclear Weapons affirmed that the obligation to distinguish during
an armed conflict between civilians and combatants, and civilian
and military objectives was a “cardinal” and “intransgressible”
principle of IHL. 153
The principles of necessity and proportionality are closely
linked in IHL. The principle of necessity “permits measures which
are actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose

147. Sassóli, et al., supra note 145.
148. Id.
149 . IHL Database - Customary IHL, Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between
Civilians and Combatants, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1
[https://perma.cc/24Q5RAKC] (last visited July 10, 2022). State practice establishes this rule as a norm of
customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed
conflicts; the principle of distinction is now codified in Articles 48, 51(2) and 52(2) of
Additional Protocol I, to which no reservations have been made. Id.
150. See e.g., Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons,
arts. 2, 4, 11, § III, Aug. 12, 1949, T. I. A. S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention (IV)]. (pertaining to the rights of protected persons in occupied territories).
151. IHL Database Customary IHL, Rule 7. The Principle of Distinction between Civilian
Objects and Military Objectives., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule7 [https://perma.cc/59AU-T7G2]
(last visited July 10, 2022).
152. Id. State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law
applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts. Id. This rule is
codified in Articles 48 and 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, to which no reservations have
been made. Id.
153. Id.; see also, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 64, at ¶¶ 78-79.
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and are not otherwise prohibited by international humanitarian
law.” 154 It further limits the degree and kind of force used in
military operations required to pressure the enemy into a partial
or complete submission as soon as feasible “with minimum
expenditure of life and resources.” 155 Proportionality functions as
a limiting factor in otherwise necessary military actions: “[it] seeks
to limit damage [in] military operations by requiring that the
effects of the means and methods of warfare used must not be
disproportionate to the military advantage[s] sought.” 156 It thus
prohibits attacks against otherwise legitimate military objectives
where the impact of the attack in terms of death or injury to
civilians and/or damage to civilian objects is expected to be
excessive compared to the military gain sought. 157 The question
raised by the foregoing definitions of the necessity and
proportionality is this: what constitutes a “legitimate military
objective?” In short, legitimate military objectives are those that
“by their nature, location purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action, and whose partial or total
154. Military Necessity, in ICRC CASEBOOK - HOW DOES THE LAW PROTECT IN WAR?,
[https://perma.cc/R3K2-ZZ2D](last visited July 10, 2022). The principle of
proportionality in attack is codified in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, and
repeated in Article 57, and is a settled rule of customary international law. Fundamentals
of IHL, in ICRC CASEBOOK - HOW DOES THE LAW PROTECT IN WAR?,
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/militarynecessity#:~:text=The%20%E2%80%9Cprinciple%20of%20military%20necessity,proh
ibited%20by%20international%20humanitarian%20law
[https://perma.cc/8AHSN327] (last visited July 10, 2022).
155. International Committee of the Red Cross, What is IHL?, INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS (Sept. 18, 2015),
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/whatihl#:~:text=The%20principle%20of%20military%20necessity,expenditure%20of%20lif
e%20and%20resources [https://perma.cc/U3WE-CJAU].
156. Proportionality, in ICRC CASEBOOK - HOW DOES THE LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, http
s://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/proportionality [https://perma.cc/5RRY-7CPK] (last
visited July 6, 2022). The principle of proportionality in attack is codified in Article
51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, and repeated in Article 57, and is a settled rule of
customary international law. See IHL Database - Customary IHL - Rule 14. Proportionality
in Attack, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14 [https://perma.cc/643K-JTHR] (last visited July
10, 2022).
157. Proportionality in Attacks (under IHL), WEAPONS LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://w
ww.weaponslaw.org/glossary/proportionality-in-attacks-ihl [https://perma.cc/D83GQJ77] (last visited July 6, 2022).
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destruction, capture or neutralization [ . . . ] offers a definite
military advantage.” 158
Last but certainly not least, humanity as a principle is the
animating force behind all of IHL. 159 Operationally, “the principle
of humanity protects those who are not or no longer actively
participating in hostilities and provides for their humane
treatment at all times.” 160 It further protects combatants and
others who directly participate in hostilities from superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering. 161 It does so primarily through
codification in the various IHL treaties already referenced,
especially the Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols. 162 At the same time, this principle functions as a norm of
customary international law to ensure that even in situations not
covered by these international agreements, “civilians and
combatants remain under the protection [ . . . ] of international law
derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity
and [ . . . ] the dictates of public conscience.” 163
158. Military Objectives, in ICRC CASEBOOK - HOW DOES THE LAW PROTECT IN WAR?,
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/military-objectives [https://perma.cc/Y87T-NCSA]
(last visited July 6, 2022). The definition of military objectives is codified in Article 52 of
Additional Protocol I and is a rule of customary international law); Id.
159. See JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
66, (Martinus Nijhoff & Henry Dunant Institute, Dordrecht/Geneva eds., 1985); see also
Classification - International Armed Conflict, supra note 45, (“International humanitarian
law rests on a careful balancing between the foundational principles of humanity and
military necessity.”).
160. Legal Framework - International Humanitarian Law, supra note 150.
161. Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering, WEAPONS LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, htt
p://www.weaponslaw.org/glossary/superfluous-injury-or-unnecessary-suffering
[https://perma.cc/K6MS-SENL] (last visited July 6, 2022).
162. See GENEVA CONVENTION (IV), supra note 150 at arts. 3, 5, 27,37, 40, 100, 127,
158.
163. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 317, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994),
https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_49_10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N782-5VYP]. The Martens clause is a principle of customary
international humanitarian law that has been largely codified in other IHL instruments; it
essentially confirms that the conduct of belligerents remains regulated by customary
international law where treaties may not apply. See Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause
and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 INT. REV. RED CROSS (1997),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jnhy.htm
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Not surprisingly, the principles referenced are as much at the
core of IHRL as they are of IHL; indeed, the principle of humanity
is the common denominator of both. “It is widely recognized
nowadays by the international community that . . . human rights
obligations derive from the [same] recognition of inherent rights
of all human beings [which are] affected both in times of peace and
in times of war.” 164 Accordingly, we now turn to Part IV, where I
examine the interplay of IHL and IHRL using specific scenarios
addressing various digital rights issues that arise in the context of
armed conflict within the UNGP framework.
IV. ICT COMPANIES

The objective of Part IV is to examine in more detail how IHRL
and IHL function concurrently in the context of international
armed conflict to the benefit of protected persons, and how
technology companies and their allies can work together to
reinforce these protections within the UNGP framework. "This
penultimate Part is divided into two sections. Section A lays out a
case study highlighting several digital rights issues that have arisen
or may arise during armed conflict, such as Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. This case study has been adapted and expanded from a
hypothetical initially developed by Jason Pielemeier, Executive
Director of the Global Network Initiative (“GNI”), 165 as part of its
groundbreaking work in this area. 166 I will return to the
[https://perma.cc/UJ29-HBJ6] (“Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been
issued . . . the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of
the law of nations, as they result from the usages among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.”).
164. UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 5–6.
165. Team, Global Network Initiative, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/team/
[https://perma.cc/N5GS-E5GA] (last visited Sept. 25, 2022).
166. See Aligning Digital Responses to Armed Conflict with Enduring Values, THE GNI
BLOG,
(June
16,
2022),
https://medium.com/global-network-initiativecollection/aligning-digital-responses-to-armed-conflict-with-enduring-valuesdffb019ae8d [https://perma.cc/L2BD-DAWC] (last accessed Aug. 26, 2022); Arturo J.
Carrillo, Between a Rock and a Hard Place? ICT Companies, Armed Conflict, and International
Law, THE GNI BLOG, (July 1, 2022), https://medium.com/global-network-initiativecollection/between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-41f1ac3e62dc
[https://perma.cc/7ZCC4BE8] (last accessed Aug. 26, 2022).
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importance of multi-stakeholder initiatives (“MSIs”) and of GNI
further below. 167
The issues raised by the Ukraine-based case study force a
closer examination of the real-world interplay between IHL and
IHRL in the ICT space, which in practice turns out to be much less
complementary than the theory of concurrent application
suggests. That is the subject of Section B. After narrating the
scenario in its entirety, the second one breaks it down into three
distinct “segments” to pursue separate, though interrelated,
analyses. Each segment will encompass a cluster of related issues
to facilitate the exercise. All issues explored in Section B will center
on the actions of the belligerents, with an emphasis on State (i.e.,
Russia’s) conduct when functioning as an occupying power. 168 The
ensuing evaluation will draw upon the prior discussions in Parts I
and II, supra, to build on the exposition therein regarding the
applicable bodies of law, their scope of application, and the
analyses of select government measures adopted using ICTs to
access, curtail or promote certain types of data, content or
information.
A. Case Study: Russia’s War in Ukraine

Assume that several months after the Russian invasion of
Ukraine, Ukrainian mobile network operators (“MNOs”) in
Kyiv received written demands from Russian military officials
to shut down connectivity for the oblast province of Donetsk,
which they have captured and occupied, allegedly to protect
civilian lives. The MNOs refused. The Russian military then
forced Ukrainian MNO employees in the city of Donetsk: (1) to
shut down all connectivity to the region; (2) to re-route
connectivity via Russian networks; and (3) to install
surveillance equipment on local routers, and re-establish
167. See infra Part IV Conclusion.
168. The case study assumes that Russia is an occupying power, though there is some
debate about whether under international law that is in fact the case at the time of this
writing. See Kalandarishvili-Mueller, supra note 89 (arguing that occupation “by proxy” is
recognized under international law and established in the Donbas/Donetsk region of
Ukraine, such that Russia is subject to all the pertinent normative framework prescribed
by IHL, including the grave breaches regime, for what occurs there).
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consumer connectivity while claiming authority as an
occupying force. The MNOs complied. Almost immediately,
the Russian military authorities began monitoring
telecommunications in the region and demanding personal
data from internet service providers (“ISPs”) and MNOs on the
Ukrainian residents remaining in the city of Donetsk, which
they justify as necessary security measures.

Once in control of the telecommunications infrastructure for
the Donetsk region, the Russian forces permitted only
authorized news and entertainment sources to be broadcasted
or distributed throughout the occupied territory. All others
are blocked, mirroring the restrictions in effect in Russia itself.
The Russian and Ukrainian language television channels, and
other media outlets broadcasting to the local population in the
Donetsk region are filled almost exclusively with reports of
Russian military victories and other information promoting
Moscow’s version of events. At the same time, the Russian
authorities used the telecommunications infrastructure to
transmit and reinforce informational campaigns promoting
pro-Russian content throughout the rest of Ukrainian
territory. These campaigns appear geared towards shaping
public opinion among the Ukrainian civilian population more
broadly regarding Russia’s valiant efforts to “liberate” the
country from “fascism” and foreign influences.
In light of the developments described, the Ukrainian State
Service of Special Communications and Information
Protection (“SSSCIP”) based in Kyiv issued two sets of orders.
First, it ordered all MNOs still operating in Ukraine to issue
text messages to their subscribers in Donetsk explaining that
their mobile phone and internet connections were now
censored and unsecure. It further urged them to resist Russian
occupation and encouraged downloads of VPNs. The SSSCIP
invokes its authority under the recent constitutionally enacted
law, which declared a state of emergency, granting it
emergency powers that, among other things, allowed it to
curtail due process. The MNOs, fearing for employee safety in
Donetsk, refused. Citing cybersecurity concerns, the SSSCIP
then ordered MNOs to disconnect and disable the cell towers,
and any transmission of communications services to
subscribers in Donetsk. It made clear that if the MNOs did not
implement the order immediately, the Ukrainian authorities
were prepared to enforce it directly. The MNOs complied.
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The SSSCIP issued a second round of orders to the Ukrainian
MNOs in Kyiv with the aim of combatting what it denounced
as Russian disinformation and war propaganda in the Donetsk
region and throughout Ukraine generally. Those orders
prohibited MNOs and other ICT operators from enabling,
facilitating, or contributing to broadcasting or distributing any
content by media sources, entities or bodies identified by
SSSCIP as promoting Russian propaganda or disinformation.
This included transmission or distribution by any means such
as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet
video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or preinstalled. The list of proscribed media sources included those
coming from Russia proper, such as Russia Today in all
languages and Sputnik, as well as several Russian-controlled
local stations broadcasting from the Donetsk region. The
MNOs complied.
Months later, after protracted fighting, Ukrainian troops and
their allies succeed in retaking the Donetsk region from the
Russian occupiers, who are forced to retreat back into Russian
territory. The SSSCIP immediately ordered MNOs in Kyiv and
Donetsk to dismantle all Russian modifications to the
telecommunications networks and re-establish connectivity
to subscribers in the region, which they did. However, given
continued skirmishes with pro-Russian factions and reports of
retaliation against locals who collaborated with the occupying
forces in Donetsk, the Ukrainian authorities began demanding
that the MNOs provide them with real-time location
information for certain subscribers under surveillance
pursuant to the emergency powers enacted, and without
complying with normal due process procedures. The MNOs
complied. At the same time, the SSSCIP informed MNOs that it
will be installing surveillance equipment like that used by the
former Russian occupiers to give it direct access to such
information and much more, citing the persistent security
threats in the region.

B. Analysis of Ukraine Case Study

As noted in the introduction to this Part, I will now break the
case study down into three distinct segments, each encompassing
a series of related issues to be analyzed. Let us begin with the first
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and last paragraph comprising Segment 1, which raises basic
questions concerning the obligations of belligerents in occupied
and formerly occupied territories.
Segment 1:
Assume that several months after the Russian invasion of
Ukraine, Ukrainian mobile network operators (“MNOs”) in
Kyiv received written demands from Russian military officials
to shut down connectivity for the oblast province of Donetsk,
which they have captured and occupied, allegedly to protect
civilian lives. The MNOs refused. The Russian military then
forced Ukrainian MNO employees in the city of Donetsk: (1) to
shut down all connectivity to the region; and (2) to re-route
connectivity via Russian networks, (3) to install surveillance
equipment on local routers, and re-establish consumer
connectivity while claiming authority as an occupying
force. The MNOs complied. Almost immediately, the Russian
military authorities began monitoring telecommunications in
the region and demanding personal data from ISPs and MNOs
on the Ukrainian residents that remained in the city of
Donetsk, which they justified as necessary security measures.
(...)

Months later, after protracted fighting, Ukrainian troops and
their allies succeeded in retaking the Donetsk region from the
Russian occupiers who were forced to retreat back into
Russian territory. The SSSCIP immediately ordered MNOs in
Kyiv and Donetsk to dismantle all Russian modifications to the
telecommunications networks and re-establish connectivity
to subscribers in the region, which they did. However, given
continued skirmishes with pro-Russian factions and reports of
retaliation against locals who collaborated with the occupying
forces in Donetsk, the Ukrainian authorities began demanding
that the MNOs provide them with real-time location
information for certain subscribers under surveillance
pursuant to the emergency powers enacted, and without
complying with normal due process procedures. The MNOs
complied. At the same time, the SSSCIP informed MNOs that it
will be installing surveillance equipment like that used by the
former Russian occupiers to give it direct access to such
information and much more, citing the persistent security
threats in the region.

Beginning with the first paragraph, have the MNOs reacted to
the Russian demands in line with the applicable international law
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framework? To respond, we must first outline the well-defined IHL
parameters governing a belligerent party’s conduct in occupied
territories during an international armed conflict. 169 A territory is
deemed occupied when it falls under the authority and effective
control of the adverse foreign armed forces and such “occupation
extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established and can be exercised.” 170 In addition to the basic IHL
principles defined in the prior Part (i.e., distinction, necessity,
proportionality, and humanity), States, such as Russia, acting as an
occupying power are bound by the more detailed rules established
in conventional and customary IHL specific for occupied
territories. 171 The duties of the occupying power emanate
primarily from the 1907 Hague Convention and its Regulations,172
the Fourth Geneva Convention, 173 and certain provisions of
Additional Protocol I and customary international humanitarian

169. See International Committee of the Red Cross, OCCUPATION AND OTHER FORMS OF
FOREIGN
ADMINISTRATION
OF
TERRITORY
(2012),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4094.pdf; see also Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 136 (July 9, 2004); Yoram Dinstein, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
170. Hague Regulations (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art.
42, Jan. 26, 1910, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; International Committee of the Red Cross,
HOW
DOES
LAW
PROTECT
IN
WAR?
–
Glossary:
Occupation,
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/occupation [https://perma.cc/4RAG-VFDV]; see also
Kalandarishvili-Mueller, supra note 89 (outlining the various approaches under
international law used to determine control over occupied territory by adverse foreign
powers during armed conflict); Eyal Benavisti, The International Law of Occupation (1st
ed. 2006).
171. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
172. Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Jan. 26, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, R.S. No. 539; Hague Regulations (IV), supra note 170, at arts.
42–56; International Committee of the Red Cross, Introduction to the Hague Regulations
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=4D47F92DF3966A7EC125
63CD002D6788&action=openDocument [https://perma.cc/6XAC-5BLC](“The provisions
of the [ . . . ] Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, are considered as embodying rules of
customary international law. As such they are also binding on States which are not
formally parties to them.”) (Quoting D. Schindler and J. Toman, THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, at 69-93 (Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1988)).
173. See Geneva Convention supra note 24 and accompanying text. The relevant
provisions are Geneva Convention IV Articles 27-34 and 47-78.
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law. 174 It is critical to keep in mind that under this framework,
military occupation by definition is treated as a temporary
situation and the rights of the occupying power are limited to the
period of its duration; the occupying power does not acquire
sovereignty over the territory during that time. 175
In practice, the occupying power must respect the laws in
force in the occupied territory, unless they constitute a threat to its
security or an obstacle to the application of the international law
of occupation referenced herein. 176 Generally speaking, adverse
military forces in occupied territory are bound to “restore law and
order and public life” to the furthest extent possible; 177 this means
that local laws remain in force except with respect to the occupying
power’s security. 178 Hence, the occupying power may adopt the
measures necessary to ensure the security of its forces in the
territory. 179 It is also worth noting that “civilians have no
obligation towards the occupying power other than the obligation
inherent in their civilian status, i.e., not to participate in
hostilities.” 180 Any persons who take up arms to resist occupation
will lose their status as civilians and its corresponding protections
174. For an exhaustive, if dated, database of customary norms, see the International
Committee
of
the
Red
Cross,
IHL
DATABASE
(2005),
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1 [https://perma.cc/FS3F-BCS8]. As noted,
for example, the Hague Convention of 1907’s rules relating to occupation are binding
customary international law. The ICJ has held that “the provisions of the Hague Regulations
have become part of customary law . . .” Israeli Wall, supra note 169, at ¶ 89.
175. An occupation is characterized by governing power controlled by the non-local
authority. Accordingly, the return of that to local authorities either through annexation by
the hostile power, return to the original authority, or transfer of power to some third
entity, ends the occupation. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Occupation and
international
law:
questions
and
answers,
§
5,
(Apr.
8,
2004),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm
[https://perma.cc/6RFQ-A6C7].
176. See id.
177. Hague Regulations (IV), supra note 170, at art. 43; See International Committee
of the Red Cross, How Does Law Protect in War?, pt. IV. Special Rules on Occupied
Territories
https://casebook.icrc.org/law/civilian-population#iv_8
[https://perma.cc/CR9B-C5K3].
178. See Hague Regulations (IV), supra note 170, at Art. 43; Geneva Convention (IV),
supra note 150, at Art. 64; How Does Law Protect in War?, supra note 178, pt IV.
179. Id.
180. How Does Law Protect in War?, supra note 177, pt. IV.
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under IHL. 181 On a related front, “[p]rivate property cannot be
confiscated[,]” 182 except pursuant to “local legislation.” 183 Public
property and resources can be administered by the occupying
power “but only under the rules of usufruct.” 184 Indeed, the
occupying power is responsible for exercising public authority and
overseeing the territory, as did the sovereign State previously
controlling the territory, to the extent feasible under the
circumstances. 185 As the International Committee of the Red Cross
(“ICRC”) observes:
[T]he obligations of the occupying power can be logically
summed up as permitting life in the occupied territory to
continue as normally as possible. IHL is therefore strong in
protecting the status quo ante, but weak in responding to any
new needs experienced by the population in the occupied
territory. The longer the occupation lasts, the more
shortcomings IHL tends to reveal. 186

Returning to the first paragraph of the fact pattern, remember
that the mobile network operators based in Kyiv had refused
written demands from Russian military officials to shut down
connectivity for the oblast province of Donetsk to allegedly protect
civilian lives there. Because the Russian occupation in the case
study is limited to the Donetsk region, the officials issuing such

181 . IHL provides civilians no right to resist occupation nor liberate occupied
territory, except insofar as they might form a levee en masse in accordance with Article
4(A)(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 150, at
art. 4(A)(6). Civilians who engage in such acts surrender their protection as civilians for
the duration of their direct participation in hostilities. Protocol I, supra note 48, at art.
13(3). After their direct participation has ended, such civilians are also liable to
prosecution by the occupying power, although they retain their protected status, with the
potential exception of their rights to communication. See Geneva Convention (IV), supra
note 150, at arts. 4–5; see also How Does Law Protect in War?, supra note 177.
182. How Does Law Protect in War?, supra note 177, at IV. Special Rules on Occupied
Territories; Occupation and international humanitarian law: questions and answers, supra
note 175; Hague Regulations (IV), supra note 170, at art. 46.
183. How Does Law Protect in War?, supra note 177; Hague Regulations (IV), supra
note 170, at art. 46.
184. How Does Law Protect in War?, supra note 177; Hague Regulations (IV), supra
note 170, at art. 55.
185. How Does Law Protect in War?, supra note 177.
186. Id.
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orders did not have the authority to impose their conditions,
justified or not, on private ICT actors outside that territory who
were still bound to respect Ukrainian law and authority. 187 Those
MNOs were thus well within their rights to refuse those Russian
demands.
At the same time, however, the same Russian officials did have
the authority to impose certain conditions within the occupied
territory with respect to the MNOs based in Donetsk if: (1) the
measures enacted were necessary to ensure the security of the
Russian forces there, or (2) they were necessary to maintain law
and order consistent with local law. 188 It is unlikely that the first
condition demanded of and implemented by the regional MNOs—
re-routing connectivity via Russian networks—met the criterion of
safeguarding the security of the occupying forces because any
connection between the two seemed tenuous at best. Enabling
disinformation and pro-Russian propaganda, as that edict was
plainly intended to do, served different purposes altogether,
including the central objective of influencing public opinion. 189
That issue is examined under Segment 3.
Whether the second measure—installing surveillance
equipment on local routers to monitor the local population—was
“necessary” to protect the security of Russian forces or maintaining
law and order is a fact-specific question dependent on the
conditions prevailing in the region at the time the measure was
promulgated. 190 But, given the nature of the Ukrainian conflict, it is
likely to pass muster in most cases. On the one hand, there is no
express right to privacy or data protection in conventional IHL.191

187. See supra notes 212–23 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text.
189. See supra section III.A.
190. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Contemporary Challenges to IHL –
Occupation: overview, (June 11, 2012), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/war-andlaw/contemporary-challenges-for-ihl/occupation/overview-occupation.htm
[https://perma.cc/LKE3-BRJ9] (“ . . . to fulfil those important responsibilities while
ensuring its own security, the occupying power is granted important rights and powers,
which may also take the form of measures of constraint over the local population when
necessity so requires.”).
191 . Omar Yousef Shehabi, Emerging Technologies, Digital Privacy, and Data
Protection in Military Occupation, in THE RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN TIMES
OF ARMED CONFLICT, 100 (NATO CCDCOE; Russell Buchan and Asaf Lubin eds., 2022),
https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2022/06/The-Rights-to-Privacy-and-Data-Protection-in-
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Efforts to derive safeguards for digital privacy from the general
duties owed to civilians as protected persons under the existing
IHL framework provide “sparse” protection at best. 192 On the other
hand, IHL recognizes that the view of what an occupying power
might consider “necessary” when adopting security measures “is
more permissive than the conception of military necessity” that
governs elsewhere under IHL. 193 Given the volatile climate
prevailing in the disputed region of Donetsk, it is likely that
surveillance measures enacted under such circumstances would
be viewed as necessary under IHL to preserving the occupants’
security in the region, and even arguably to help maintain public
order. 194 The MNOs were thus justified in complying with Russian
demands in this respect (leaving aside for the moment that the
MNOs probably had no choice and would have been coerced to do
so regardless).
Nor does IHRL serve to fill the gaps left by IHL in this scenario,
despite its undisputed relevance. It is true that “[IHRL] is widely
recognized as applicable in situations of occupation [and] the
exploration of the legal interplay between human rights law and
occupation law [is] essential, particularly in relation to matters
where IHL is silent, vague or unclear . . . ;” but it is equally true that
Armed-Conflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5QR-B9Q8] (lamenting that “[t]he absence of
express rights to privacy and data protection in conventional IHL is unlikely to change
anytime soon.”).
192. Shehabi, supra note 191, at 99. For examples of these efforts, see, e.g., Asaf Lubin,
The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection Under International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW:
FURTHER REFLECTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 462, 462-91 (Robert Kolb, et al. eds., Edward Elgar
Publ’g 2022); see also EYAL BENAVISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW of OCCUPATION, 96-99
(2006).
193. Shehabi, supra note 191, at 99.
194. Mary Ellen O’Connell has argued that data privacy rights should remain the same
in war as in peace; See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, Data Privacy Rights: The Same in
War and Peace, in THE RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT
12, 12 (Russell Buchan & Asaf Lubin eds., NATO CCDCOE Publ’n 2022),
https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2022/06/The-Rights-to-Privacy-and-Data-Protection-inArmed-Conflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXZ6-AF37]. For a number of reasons, many of
them outlined throughout this article, I find such arguments unpersuasive.
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this dynamic can apply only to “certain types of activity.” 195 The
question for our purposes, therefore, is this: do existing and
emerging norms of IHRL apply in the Russian-occupied territory of
Ukraine to fill the pertinent lacunae left by IHL specifically with
respect to the data privacy rights of the civilian population? The
answer is in the negative for a variety of reasons. First and
foremost, as noted already and discussed in more detail below,
“local law” in Ukraine at the time of the events under study
encompassed only non-derogable human rights, which do not
include privacy or freedom of expression. 196 Even if it was
assumed there was concurrent application of IHRL without
derogation and IHL, there were still substantive obstacles in
attempting to extrapolate data privacy protections from IHRL to
supplement IHL during military occupation. Put simply, the
underlying premises that allow for conventional human rights like
data privacy to be safeguarded in democratic and rule-of-law
settings presumed by IHRL treaties do not hold on the
“battlefield.” 197 They are especially “inapposite in the context of
military occupation.” 198 This is because, as remarked upon by one
expert, “there is something qualitatively different about data in the
hands of the occupying power’s armed forces . . . the law of
occupation, by its architecture, would thus not seem to admit of . . .
a limitation [imposed by data privacy rights]: if intelligence
gathering and storage is a legitimate security measure, then any
bona fide military necessity would justify its use.” 199

195. OCCUPATION AND OTHER FORMS OF FOREIGN ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORY, supra
note 170, at 8.
196. See supra notes 42, 67–68 and accompanying text.
197. See HOW DOES LAW PROTECT in WAR?, supra note 177 at Part III (“While the
purpose of both IHL and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is to obtain respect for
the individual, each of these branches of law has its own implementation approaches and
specific mechanisms, tailored to the typical situations for which they were created.
Violations of IHL typically occur on the battlefield. They can only be addressed by
immediate reaction. [IHRL] is more often violated through judicial, administrative or
legislative decisions or inaction against which appeal and review procedures are
appropriate and meaningful remedies. In the implementation of IHL, the recovery or the
improvement of the situation of the victims is central, and therefore a confidential,
cooperative and pragmatic approach is often more appropriate. In contrast, the victims of
traditional violations of [IHRL] want their rights to be reaffirmed, and therefore seek
public condemnation as soon as they spot violations.”).
198. Shehabi, supra note 191, at 103.
199. Shehabi, supra note 191, at 105-06.
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Another issue concerns the extraterritorial application of a
State’s human rights duties where it exercises jurisdiction or
effective control, such as during occupation in armed conflict. Our
prior discussion in Part III, supra, established that both the ICCPR
and ECHR apply extraterritorially to State parties’ actions in just
this way. 200 This means that in addition to the IHL obligations
incumbent upon Russian forces in occupied Donetsk, 201 those
forces would also be bound to respect the human rights of the
civilian population under its control in that region, just as if those
civilians resided in Russian territory. 202 Might this be the avenue
for filling the IHL lacunae? Probably not.
Russia’s poor human rights record at home, 203 together with
its flouting of the laws of war in Ukraine 204 render any discussion
of the extraterritorial application of IHRL by Russian forces during
its occupation of Ukrainian territory a theoretical one at best (and
an absurdity at worst). 205 In the case study segment, the
acknowledgement of this possibility brings to the fore a legal
paradox: given Ukraine’s derogation from its IHRL obligations, the
civilians in occupied Donetsk would be entitled to receive greater
protection under Russian human rights law applied
extraterritorially than they would under IHL or Ukrainian law.206
If nothing else, this paradox demonstrates the practical limits of

200. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 48, 91–92 and accompanying text.
202. See HOW DOES LAW PROTECT in WAR?, supra note 179, at ICJ/Israel, Separation
Wall/Security Fence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ¶¶ 102–11,
https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/icjisrael-separation-wallsecurity-fence-occupiedpalestinian-territory#part [https://perma.cc/V45J-U2BP].
203. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. To be clear, I am not arguing that
human rights law would not apply in Russian occupied territory; it does, due to Russia’s
(assumed) control of that territory. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing
the extraterritorial reach of the ICCPR under such circumstances). But given the realities
of the armed conflict in Ukraine, and Russia’s handling of the war at home and abroad, any
attempt to demand compliance by Russia’s occupying forces with human rights norms as
a practical or strategic matter borders on quixotic.
206. See generally, supra notes 64–67, 90–92 and accompanying text. (The paradox is
that Ukrainians in occupied territory enjoy greater protection from Russian law than
under their own).
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international law and human rights in times of war. A better
response would be to continue working towards the development
of new IHL norms that recognize safeguards for data relating to
protected persons and objects in a manner consistent with the
unique nature of the laws of war. 207
The foregoing helpfully advances the analysis of a related but
separate question raised in Segment 1: were the Russian orders
intended to maintain public order consistent with “local law” as
seen in the final paragraph of the case study? Would domestic law
have permitted the imposition of the same restrictive measures by
Ukrainian forces after recuperating the once occupied territories
and operating under similar circumstances as their predecessors?
In addition to dismantling the restrictions imposed by Russian
occupiers and reestablishing domestic connectivity, which they are
entitled to do, 208 the Ukrainians proceeded to impose a number of
restraints on telecommunications in the region similar to the ones
promulgated by their adversaries. Citing ongoing security
concerns and their emergency powers, Ukrainian officials first
demanded and received access to real-time location information
for certain subscribers. They also announced they would install
surveillance equipment like that used by the Russians to give them
direct access to such information and more. Assuming the
Ukrainian officials go through with these plans, are these actions
consistent with their domestic and international legal obligations
at the time? Would the MNOs thus be justified in implementing
such orders, assuming they had a choice in the matter?
The answer is almost certainly in the affirmative. Recall the
earlier discussion of the legal frameworks operating in Ukraine,
which has derogated from its principal human rights obligations
under the ICCPR and the ECHR. 209 There can be little doubt that the
constitutionally-enacted emergency legislation was justified and
thus legitimate. 210 That war-time legislation in turn authorized
action under domestic and international law to impose even
onerous restrictions on privacy rights and freedom of expression,

207. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 213–20 and accompanying text (discussing the duties of States
under international law with respect to international telecommunications infrastructure).
209. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
210. See id.
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which in peace-time would enjoy robust constitutional and legal
protections. 211 As the case study stands, the continued skirmishes
with pro-Russian factions and reports of retaliation against local
collaborators indicate substantial security challenges that seem to
justify strong measures tailored to the volatile conditions of the
ongoing armed conflict. So long as such measures were not on their
face or implemented in arbitrary or discriminatory manner, they
are presumed to be valid. 212 And if such restrictions are most likely
valid when adopted by Ukrainian authorities under their domestic
law to preserve law and order in the war-torn Donetsk region, they
are most likely going to be valid under the same “local law” when
imposed by Russian forces operating under similar circumstances
in the same region. 213 Although the Donetsk-based MNOs probably
did not have much of a choice when confronted by the Russian
occupiers’ orders to proceed in this way, these orders would
appear to fall within international legal parameters.
Segment 2
In light of the developments described, the Ukrainian State
Service of Special Communications and Information
Protection (SSSCIP) based in Kyiv issued two sets of orders.
First, it ordered all MNOs still operating in Ukraine to issue
text messages to their subscribers in Donetsk explaining that
their mobile phone and internet connections were now
censored and unsecure. It further urged them to resist Russian
occupation, and encouraged download of VPNs. The SSSCIP
invoked its authority under the recent constitutionally
enacted law, which declared a state of emergency, granting it
emergency powers that, among other things, allowed it to
curtail due process. The MNOs, feared for employee safety in
Donetsk, and refused. Citing cybersecurity concerns, the
SSSCIP then ordered MNOs to disconnect and disable the cell
towers, and any transmission of communications services to
subscribers in Donetsk. It made clear that if the MNOs did not

211. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. This means that the three-part
test will not apply.
213. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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implement the order immediately, the Ukrainian authorities
were prepared to enforce it directly. The MNOs complied.
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International law today establishes that States as a function of
their sovereignty must maintain and safeguard international
telecommunications infrastructure on their territory, both public
and private. 214 Recall that in 2021, the UN Group of Governmental
Experts (“GGE”) affirmed that “international norms and principles
that flow from sovereignty apply to the conduct by States of ICTrelated activities and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure
within their territory.” 215 The GGE explained that “States exercise
[such] jurisdiction [by] setting policy and law and establishing the
necessary mechanisms to protect ICT infrastructure on their
territory from ICT-related threats.” 216 Moreover, to the extent that
such infrastructure is established and/or operated by private
companies, the State is equally “obliged to ensure the cyber
infrastructure they operate is . . . maintained and safeguarded . . .
through the promulgation of domestic laws and regulations.” 217
The comprehensive nature of this international legal regime
insofar as it applies to both public and privately operated cyber
telecommunication services is important to understanding its
application to the Ukraine-Russia case study.
International law further recognizes that in exercise of its
sovereign prerogative, a State “may suspend . . . international cyber
communication services within its territory” or block the
transmission of any private cyber communication “that appears
contrary to its national laws, public order, or . . . that is dangerous
to its national security.” 218 The International Group of Experts who
prepared the Tallinn Manual 2.0, in its commentary to these rules,
clarified that this authority “encompasses suspension of incoming

214. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS,
ch. 11, rule 61 at 288 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017). In contemporary society, the
distinction between telecommunications in the domestic realm and international
telecommunications is increasingly blurred. Id. at 284-85. For these reasons, among
others, we will focus on the latter in this section.
215. GGE 2015 REPORT, supra note 134, at ¶ 27; GGE 2019-2021 REPORT, supra note
135, at ¶ 71(b).
216. GGE 2019-2021 REPORT, supra note 134, at ¶ 71(b).
217. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS, supra note 214, ch. 11, rule 61 commentary ¶¶ 5, 7 at 289-90.
218. Id., ch.11, rule 62 commentary ¶1 at 291-92.
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and outgoing communications, as well as those that transit a State’s
territory.” 219 The States’ prerogative in this respect is limited only
by “any international law obligations the State concerned may
shoulder prohibiting it from doing so in a particular case,” such as
IHRL. 220 It is important to highlight that these IHL rules are derived
from the existing treaty regime established by the International
Telecommunications Union (“ITU”) 221 and are thus anchored in
conventional international law. Similarly, the Tallinn 2.0 Group of
Experts referenced ITU norms to acknowledge that “where
situations arise in which the ability to engage in safety of life or
government communications depends on their prioritization,
States must give these communications preference.” 222 In so doing,
the Experts were concerned more with natural disasters than
armed conflict and occupation, though it surely is relevant to the
latter scenario as well. 223
The foregoing establishes that a normative regime under IHL
is available to guide the analysis of situations like the one
described in Segment 2. And to better understand the relevant
rules, we can refer to State practice. For example, the Tallinn 2.0
Experts’ view that the Egyptian authorities’ 2011 shutdown of
international internet and mobile telephony in response to the civil
uprising resulting from the “Arab Spring” was authorized under
this framework. 224 If true, turning back to the case study, it is

219. Id., ch.11, rule 62 commentary ¶3 at 292-93.
220. Id., ch.11, rule 62 commentary ¶1 at 291-92.
221. Id., ch.11, rules 61-62 commentary at 288-94.
222. Id., ch. 11 ¶9 at 287. It is interesting to note that Tallin 2.0 says nothing about
disinformation, which is not surprising given that such cyber operations fall below the
cyber-attack threshold. But to the extent they may increasingly give rise to harm to
civilians and other protected persons, future editions of the Tallinn Manual will
presumably need to address this phenomenon. See generally Eian Katz, Liar’s War:
Protecting Civilians from Disinformation During Armed Conflict, 914 INT’L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS 659, 681-82 (2021).
223. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS,
supra note 214, ch. 11 ¶9 at 287.
224. Id., ch.11, rule 62 commentary ¶4 at 293. For context, amid civil unrest and
public demonstrations against the government of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Egyptian
authorities ordered telecommunications companies to cease access to internet, voice, and
text messaging for five days. Deji Olukotun and Peter Micek, Esq., Five Years Later: The
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difficult to see how the Ukrainian authorities’ orders to MNOs to
issue text messages to subscribers in militarily-occupied Donetsk
alerting them to Russian intervention and censorship violated an
international norm, much less any domestic law as modified by the
state of emergency legislation. In fact, with respect to the former
action, the Ukrainian government’s actions may even have been
required by the State’s duty to “maintain and safeguard” the
integrity of the country’s international telecommunications
infrastructure. 225
The MNOs’ decision not to comply with this otherwise
legitimate set of demands owed more to organizational “first
principles” of protecting employees from retaliation and harm, to
which it understandably gave priority, than anything else. 226
Likewise, the subsequent order to dismantle and shut down
communication services to subscribers in Donetsk for fear of
cyberattacks seems amply justified, both by the express IHL norm
allowing State suspension or stoppage of cyber communications
that threaten national security and by accepted State practice as
reflected in the Egyptian example. The MNOs were right to comply
in this case with no fear of facilitating or becoming complicit in an
international law violation. 227 Even the threats to enforce this
order directly, if not otherwise complied with by the MNOs, would
likely fall within the State’s broad prerogatives in cybersecurity. 228
A skeptic could challenge Segment 2’s analysis by pointing out
that IHRL might restrict the actions ordered by the Ukrainian
government separately from IHL, and thus reconfigure the proper
reading of the international telecommunications and humanitarian
law norms cited. They would be right to raise this issue. The GGE
has stressed, when affirming State prerogatives emanating from

Internet Shutdown that Rocked Egypt, ACCESS NOW (Jan. 21, 2016, 7:35 PM),
https://www.accessnow.org/five-years-later-the-internet-shutdown-that-rocked-egypt/
[https://perma.cc/W74A-N52P].
225. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. In transnational business settings
involving conflict like this one, international law provides only one normative input into
the calculus of ethical and responsible behavior under the UNGP framework; but it is
neither the only one in many cases, nor the dispositive one in some.
227. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 213–24 and accompanying text.
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sovereignty, that “[e]xisting obligations under international law
are [also] applicable to States’ ICT-related activity.” 229 Such
obligations include those to “respect and protect the human rights
of individuals over whom they exercise control.” 230 The Ukrainian
State’s power here is thus limited by any IHRL obligations it has
“shoulder[ed] prohibiting it from doing so in [a particular] case.”231
The Tallinn 2.0 Experts recognized this feature of the legal regime
when finding that Egypt’s temporary shutdown of
telecommunications complied with the pertinent international
obligations; they caveated their conclusion by stating that it was
proffered “without prejudice to the question of whether Egypt’s
action[s] complied with . . . respect for the international human
right to freedom of expression,” 232 which they almost certainly did
not. 233
The point is that we must examine the extent to which the
dictates of IHRL may have prohibited any of the otherwise
authorized Ukrainian State actions under review from Segment 2.
The short answer again is that Ukraine’s state of emergency
legislation derogating from its IHRL obligations signifies that no
such limits were in effect at the time of the events in question. 234 A
more interesting query, however, is what outcome follows from a
similar scenario where no derogation has taken place? Though
speculative, I would venture to say that even if the full panoply of
IHRL rights were assumed to be in effect in Ukrainian territory for
this scenario, it is not evident that it would lead to different or
better outcomes than the IHL principles outlined above. This is

229. GGE 2015 REPORT, supra note 134, at ¶ 28(b); GGE 2019-2021 REPORT, supra note
136, at ¶ 71(b).
230. Schmitt, supra note 133.
231. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS,
supra note 214, ch. 11, rule 62 commentary ¶ 1 at 291-92.
232. Id., ch. 11, rule 62 commentary ¶ 4 at 293.
233. See, e.g., WOLFGANG BENEDEK & MATTHIAS C. KETTEMEN, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
THE INTERNET §6.2.1 (Council of Europe Publishing 2013) (“Using the well-established
three-part test, already the legality requirement is not met, as the shutdowns [in Egypt in
2013] were not based on law but rather on executive decisions . . . Complete Internet
shutdowns will hardly ever meet the necessity test.”).
234. See supra notes 43, 65–68 and accompanying text.
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especially true given the features of the international armed
conflict reflected in the case study, together with the appropriate
operation of lex specialis. 235
The first set of orders regarding the issuance of government
warnings do not on their face seem to impinge on fundamental
rights at all, but rather appear directed at preserving them in a
manner consistent with the State’s duty to protect its population
under both IHL and IHRL. 236 In this vein, urgent government
communications to protect national security and public order must
be given priority in times of war as well as peace. 237 Only with
respect to the second set of orders would freedom of expression be
reasonably implicated such as concerns about the Ukrainian
authorities’ efforts to sever communication links with the occupied
territory in the face of serious threats of Russian cyber-attacks.
Nevertheless, in that case as well, wartime national security
concerns, along with other prevailing exigencies, could justify an
exception to freedom of expression under the applicable human
rights regime pursuant to the standard “three-part” test, even an
exception as categorical as a partial stoppage of cyber
communications to the occupied territory. 238 An alternative
approach with a similar outcome is provided by the operation of
lex specialis, which would require the direct application of the
235. See prior discussion of lex specialis and the concurrent application of IHL and
IHRL, supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. Much has been written about the proper
interpretation and application of lex specialis in this context. See e.g., MARKO MILANOVIC, The
Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law¸ in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (2014); Office of the High Comm’r on Human Rights, The International Legal
Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/01, at 54-70 (2011).
236. For example, both the ICCPR and ECHR mandate that a state respect and ensure
respect for human rights obligations. See ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 2; see ECHR, supra
note 36, at art. 1. Similarly, although there is no similar provision to protect one’s own
civilians, the IHL mandates respect for the civilians of an adversary or neutral party. See
Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 150, at art. 4 (protecting those who “find themselves
. . . in the hands of a Party to the conflict . . . of which they are not nationals.”).
237. See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. See also Benedek & Kettemen, supra
235 (“This is not to say, however, that a partial blackout must always be illegal . . . If the
authorities are technologically unable to shutdown the network services that fuel the
conflict, and an appropriate law has been democratically passed, it might be proportionate,
in order to safeguard the lives of others, to introduce brief regional Internet shutdowns as
an ultima ration.”).
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specific IHL norm authorizing such cyber stoppages under these
circumstances, much in the same way that lex specialis underpins
IHL’s recognition that the killing of combatants during armed
conflict does not violate the right to life. 239 A fuller discussion of
this regime and its import for the case study is set out in response
to Segment 3.
Segment 3:
Once in control of the telecommunications infrastructure for
the Donetsk region, the Russian forces permit only authorized
news and entertainment sources to be broadcasted or
distributed throughout the occupied territory. All others are
blocked, mirroring the restrictions in effect in Russia itself.
The Russian and Ukrainian language television channels, and
other media outlets broadcasting to the local population in the
Donetsk region are filled almost exclusively with reports of
Russian military victories and other information promoting
Moscow’s version of events. At the same time, the Russian
authorities use the telecommunications infrastructure to
transmit and reinforce informational campaigns promoting
pro-Russian content throughout the rest of Ukrainian
territory. These campaigns appear geared towards shaping
public opinion among the Ukrainian civilian population more
broadly regarding Russia’s valiant efforts to “liberate” the
country from “fascism” and foreign influences.
(...)

The SSSCIP issued a second round of orders to the Ukrainian
MNOs in Kyiv with the aim of combatting what it denounced
as Russian disinformation and war propaganda in the Donetsk
region and throughout Ukraine generally. Those orders
prohibited MNOs and other ICT operators from enabling,
facilitating, or contributing to broadcasting or distributing any
content by media sources, entities or bodies identified by
SSSCIP as promoting Russian propaganda or disinformation.
This included transmission or distribution by any means such
as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet
video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or preinstalled. The list of proscribed media sources included those

239. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
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coming from Russia proper, such as Russia Today in all
languages and Sputnik, as well as several Russian-controlled
local stations broadcasting from the Donetsk region. The
MNOs complied.
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This segment highlights a number of contemporary legal
challenges relating to the propagation of war propaganda and
disinformation, which are increasingly recognized as harmful to
civilians in armed conflict settings. 240 Strictly speaking, neither is
prohibited by the laws of armed conflict. 241 To the contrary,
informational deception to advance military objectives through the
use of ruses, decoy actions and misinformation is a time-honored
tactic in the conduct of hostilities. 242 Such deception is curtailed by
IHL only if it rises to the level of “perfidy” or the misuse of
protected symbols such as “white flags” or medical insignias to
obtain military advantage. 243 Indeed, these traditional IHL rules
are widely seen as outmoded given modern advances in ICTs and
the cyber operations they enable. 244 For this reason, a growing
number of commentators are clamoring for greater and more
specific regulation of information operations in war time. 245
Though still under development, a growing international
consensus posits that:
[t]he conduct of information operations or activities in armed
conflict is subject to the applicable rules of international
humanitarian law ( . . . ). These rules include, but are not
limited to, the duty to respect and ensure respect for
international humanitarian law, which entails a prohibition
against encouraging violations of IHL; the duties to respect

240 . See Jason Pielemeier, Disentangling Disinformation: What Makes Regulating
Disinformation
So
Difficult?,
2020
Utah
L.
Rev.
917,
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2020/iss4/1/
[https://perma.cc/SG5B-FP7T](general
discussion on the nature of modern disinformation); see Katz, supra note 222 (thorough
analysis of disinformation in the context of armed conflict),. For a thorough analysis of
disinformation.
241. Robin Geiss & Henning Lahmann, Protecting the Information Space in Times of
Armed
Conflict,
JUSTSECURITY
(Mar.
3,
2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/75066/protecting-the-information-space-in-times-ofarmed-conflict/ [https://perma.cc/V5W6-PSU9]; see also Katz, supra note 222, at 662.
242. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 27, at rule 57.
243. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 27, at rule 65.
244. Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 242; see Katz, supra note 222.
245. Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 242; see Katz, supra note 222.
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and to protect specific actors or objects, including medical
personnel and facilities and humanitarian personnel and
consignments; and other rules on the protection of persons
who do not or no longer participate in hostilities, such as
civilians and prisoners of war. 246

Regarding the issues raised in Segment 3, it is evident that
existing rules of IHL prohibit neither the Russian occupiers’
deployment of propaganda and disinformation in and from
Donetsk, nor the Ukrainian authorities’ orders directed at
combatting the adversaries’ information operations. As seen in the
analysis of Segment 2, occupying forces enjoy significant leeway in
the interpretation of their authority to take actions to ensure the
security of their presence in the region and maintain public
order. 247 Taking control of telecommunications in the occupied
territory might well be justified as an exercise of that authority
within the broad limits permitted under contentious
circumstances. 248 Russian propaganda and misinformation
transmitted from the commandeered telecoms infrastructure were
calibrated to influence if not “control the narrative regarding the
conflict” 249 within Donetsk, as well as throughout the rest of
Ukrainian territory not under occupation.
IHL does not prohibit such information operations targeting
public opinions. 250 Indeed, on these facts, none of the Russian
occupiers’ actions would transgress the emerging principles on
inciting violence against protected persons and objects, or
otherwise harming the well-being of the civilian population,
through the use of disinformation tactics in wartime. 251 It follows
as well that this reasoning applies to the countermeasures adopted
246 . Dapo Akande et al., Oxford Statement on International Law Protections in
Cyberspace: The Regulation of Information Operations and Activities, JUSTSECURITY (June 2,
2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/76742/oxford-statement-on-international-lawprotections-in-cyberspace-the-regulation-of-information-operations-and-activities/
[https://perma.cc/PB6Q-CFNH].
247. See supra notes 170–86 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 190–199 and accompanying text.
249. Katz, supra note 222, at 661.
250. See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text.
251. See Katz, supra note 222, at 660, 668.
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by their Ukrainian adversaries to combat the disinformation
operations, so long as those measures are not themselves
otherwise prohibited by IHL. 252 In other words, the Ukrainian
authorities orders to MNOs to censor the Russian media sources
participating in those operations would likewise be permitted
under the laws of war, and the MNOs were justified in complying
with them, at least as far as IHL is concerned.
The next question, of course, is whether both sets of actions
by the belligerents would be consistent with IHRL to the extent it
is deemed applicable. Returning to the case study, we find that
Russia’s blanket repression of freedom of expression in Donetsk
mirrored its brutal repression of free speech at home, which has
been categorically criticized for transgressing human rights. 253
But, IHRL does not apply fully to the Donetsk region, a war zone. 254
Ukraine’s lawful derogation from its human rights obligations
under the ICCPR and the ECHR means that the occupying forces
under local law would most likely not be transgressing any
pertinent rules, unless their propaganda or misinformation was
directed at enabling genocide, war crimes or other crimes against
humanity. 255 Under “local” Ukrainian law amended by the state of
emergency legislation, derogation operates to leave only a handful
of non-derogable rights in effect. 256 However, the freedom of
expression or the press was not included; thereby, opening the
door to informational policies and practices by the belligerents
that do not otherwise violate IHL (e.g., perfidy, or war crimes) or
international criminal law (e.g., genocide or crimes against
humanity). 257 The only alternative would be to argue that the
Russian occupying forces were bound by certain rules of IHRL
applied extraterritorially, an approach rife with practical and
strategic challenges. 258 But even then, as the analysis of IHRL
252. See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 190–199 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 43, 66–69, 71 and accompanying text;; see also Katz, supra note
223, and accompanying text, at 672, 682.
256. See supra notes 43, 67–68, 70 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text (citing discussion of paradox
created by the scenario).
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below indicates, it is far from clear that such claims would result in
a different outcome. 259
Assuming for argument’s sake that IHRL applied fully to the
occupied Donetsk region under Ukrainian law, how should
observers analyze the interplay of that body of law with the IHL
framework governing in that territory? As previously discussed,
the two bodies of law are held to apply concurrently and, ideally,
to complement each other. 260 But what does that mean in practice?
Would the IHRL obligations incumbent on Russian forces
operating in occupied Donetsk under Ukrainian or Russian law
require them to curtail or cease their disinformation campaigns?
What about the censorship imposed by the Ukrainians seeking to
counteract the effects of those campaigns? It is worth recalling that
the overlap between IHL and IHRL is functionally limited to a
reduced number of fundamental rights such as the rights to life,
physical integrity, and personal liberty. 261 Accordingly, at some
level, contrasting the two in the context of international armed
conflict is a bit like comparing apples and oranges: both are
undeniably fruit, but there is arguably more difference between
them than similarity. While sharing a common denominator of
humanity, the two bodies of law present divergent natures and
objectives:
In the implementation of IHL, the recovery or the
improvement of the situation of the victims is central, and
therefore a confidential, cooperative and pragmatic approach
is often more appropriate. In contrast, the victims of
traditional violations of [IHRL] want their rights to be
reaffirmed, and therefore seek public condemnation as soon
as they spot violations. A more legalistic and dogmatic
approach is therefore necessary in implementing [IHRL];
indeed, such an approach corresponds to the human rights
logic, which historically represents a challenge to the

259. See infra notes 264–89 and accompanying text.
260. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 27, at 8.
261. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 27; See also Sassòli et al.,
supra note 145, at II. Protected Rights.
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“sovereign”, while respect for IHL can be considered as a
treatment conceded by the “sovereign”. 262
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Whether the human right to freedom of expression is one of
those core norms that enjoys concurrent application in practice
under IHL is, at best, an open question. 263 Some commentators
have suggested that the rule of lex specialis requires resorting to
IHRL to fill certain gaps in IHL, for example, to protect press
freedoms in occupied territories. 264 But IHL already provides
express protections to war correspondents and other journalists:
the former are treated as members of the armed forces, while the
latter are protected persons akin to civilians. 265 Similarly, the right
of communication is reserved for both POWs and civilians in
occupied territories; 266 though admittedly bare-bones as a form of
expression, the express right of communication in these situations,
like the protections for war correspondents and journalists, belies
the suggestion, at least with respect to freedom of expression, that
there may be any “accidental” gaps in IHL that require
supplementing.
In any event, we proceed now to analyze Segment 3 from the
perspective of IHRL’s concept of freedom of expression applied in
situations of international armed conflict. According to the UN
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, speaking to the
problem of disinformation in general under IHRL:
262. Sassòli et al., supra note 145, at III. Implementation.
263. Sassòli et al., supra note145; see also supra text accompanying note 57.
264 . Sassòli et al., supra note 145; see also supra text accompanying note 57
(suggesting IHRL fills that gap where IHL is silent).
265. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4,
Aug.
12,
1949,
T.I.A.S.
No.
3364,
75
U.N.T.S.
135,
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/interview/protection-journalistsinterview270710.htm#:~:text=Inasmuch%20as%20they%20are%20civilians,Conventions%20an
d%20Additional%20Protocol%20I [https://perma.cc/7294-NFVX] [hereinafter Geneva
Convention (III)]; War correspondents are entitled to embed in the armed forces and are
accorded POW status if captured. Id.
266. See id., art. 71; Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 150, art. 107, . It is also true
that this right to communication is limited by articles in the POW and Civilians Conventions
that allow for some censorship. See Geneva Convention (III), supra note 265, art. 76; and
Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 150 art. 112. But even that curtailment signals a
deliberate decision by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions to regulate the
communications of protected persons during the armed conflict.
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States should not make, sponsor, encourage or disseminate
statements that they know or should reasonably know to be
false, or authorize Internet shutdowns as a means of
combatting disinformation. They should restrain from
restricting freedom of expression online or offline except in
accordance with the requirements of articles 19(3) and 20(2)
of the [ICCPR], strictly and narrowly construed. 267

ICCPR Article 19(3) sets out the “three-part” test for
permissible State restrictions on freedom of expression,
recognizing only those measures that are enacted pursuant to law
to advance a legitimate State aim, and that are both necessary and
proportional. 268 Article 20(2), in turn, requires States to outlaw
any and all “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.”269
It became rapidly apparent when contrasting them that, due to the
divergent nature and function of each, the IHRL norms cited either
conflict or are in tension with the principles, goals and applicable
rules of IHL described above. 270
The clearest example of this is ICCPR Article 20(1), that the
UN Special Rapporteur does not mention, which prohibits any
“propaganda for war,” a norm that by definition can only apply in
times of peace. 271 Indeed, the UN Human Rights Committee in
General Comment 11 recognizes this dissonance to an extent when
it affirms that “[t]he provisions of article 20, paragraph 1, do not
prohibit advocacy of the sovereign right of self-defense . . . ,” 272
alluding to inherent limits arising in and around international
267. Khan, supra note 86, at 18 ¶ 88.
268. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Int’l Covenant on Civil and Human Rights, General
Comment No. 34, art. 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 ¶
22 (2011).
269. ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 20.
270. Sassòli et al., supra note 145, at III. Implementation.
271 . See, e.g., Off. of the UN High Comm’n for Hum. Rts. (OHCHR), GENERAL
COMMENT NO. 11, Prohibition of Propaganda for War and Inciting National, Racial or
Religious Hatred (Art. 20), CCPR/C/GC/11 (Sept. 7, 1983). In addition, there is confusion in
modern times as to what constitutes propaganda for war in the digital age, not least
because international law provides little guidance.
272. See id. at 1 ¶ 2.
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armed conflict. Another example is the use of internet shutdowns
in the national security context, including armed conflict, which
under IHL norms applicable to State cyber operations are
permitted, if rarely. 273 Under extreme circumstances like those
arising during a devastating cyber-attack, internet shutdowns
could conceivably even be necessary to protect civilians and
essential civilian infrastructure. 274 To round out the point, let us
return to the question of whether the Ukrainian authorities orders
combatting Russian war propaganda and disinformation
emanating from Donetsk and Russia were lawful under IHRL as
they were pursuant to IHL.
Differences with IHL notwithstanding, if assuming that IHRL
applies in Ukraine without derogation, there is a situation similar
to the one confronted by the European Union in its series of
resolutions imposing sanctions on select Russian media outlets for
similar reasons. 275 The framework outlined in the quote above
from the UN Special Rapporteur was the very framework used to
analyze the legitimacy of the EU sanctions adopted in response to
Russian disinformation, and, as a result, found them lacking under
human rights law. 276 It is also the one that governs in the Segment
3 hypothetical. Similar to the case with the European Union’s
sanctions, the proposed Ukrainian restrictions would have to be
evaluated using the “three-part” test established by IHRL for
weighing the legitimacy of government measures that seek to limit
freedom of expression in furtherance of a legitimate State aim.277
Under this approach, “the armed conflict [functions] primarily as
context and a critical source of factual inputs for [the] analysis,”278
meaning that the stresses, contingencies, and uncertainties of war
must be factored into the analysis of each prong of the “three-part”
test.
The incongruence of analyzing wartime sanctions by a
belligerent on an adversary’s propaganda and disinformation
under a human rights regime configured primarily for peacetime
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See supra notes 218–25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104–11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
See Khan, supra note 86, at 6–8, ⁋⁋ 30–40.
Carrillo, supra note 166.
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democracies rapidly becomes evident. 279 The European Union’s
sanctions have been criticized inter alia for failing to meet the
necessary and proportional prong of that test, despite the
unprecedented nature of the challenge presented by Russia’s
documented disinformation campaigns, and the unanimous
opinion of all twenty-seven EU countries that their actions are
“consistent with the fundamental rights and . . . in particular with
the right to freedom of expression and information.” 280
One cannot help but wonder whether those critics would find
the Ukrainian government’s restrictions in Segment 3, which are
expressly modeled on the European Union’s but even broader, to
be equally lacking. The easy answer is that the Ukraine’s status as
a belligerent defending itself from invasion and occupation by
Russia distinguishes it from the non-belligerent countries that
make up the European Union, and thus would ultimately tip the
scales in its favor. But the question remains: did the critics of the
European Union’s sanctions on Russian media give proper weight
to the “armed conflict as [the] context and a critical source of
inputs” when analyzing the measures imposed under the IHRL
“three-part” test for legitimate limits on freedom of expression?
There is reason to believe they did not. 281 In any event, the impact
of armed conflict in the digital age on non-belligerent States and
how to address it are novel and challenging questions that require
deeper exploration in academic and policy circles.
What is certain is that, as pointed out already, Ukraine’s lawful
derogation under the relevant IHRL treaties ensured that in the
circumstances of the case study as originally presented, even
onerous censorship measures like these can legitimately be
279. See, e.g., Shehabi, supra note 192, at 102–03 (explaining that IHRL approaches
to data privacy “rests on a theory of procedural democracy which is inapposite in the
context of military occupation”) (emphasis in original).
280. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also Carrillo, supra note 166.
281. See The Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed that the three-part test
was properly applied by the EU Member States. Court of Justice of the European Union
Press Release No. 132/22, Judgment of the General Court in Case T-125/22 (July 27, 2022),
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2022-07/cp220132en.pd
[https://perma.cc/GJ9N-UN88].
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imposed for the duration of the constitutionally enacted state of
emergency. 282 The foregoing section, moreover, illustrates the
practical and strategic challenges to extrapolating the application
of human rights such as those to privacy and freedom of
expression, which were configured principally for peacetime and
for enforcement through the operation of the rule-of-law, into the
context of international armed conflict. Indeed, in my opinion, the
perceived “lacunae” in IHL with respect to privacy and freedom of
expression are likely no oversight or coincidence in IHL legislation
nor are they in any way inconsistent with State practice over the
centuries, including so far into modern times. 283 Data privacy in
wartime is, relatively speaking, a nascent field, 284 while
misinformation and propaganda have always been as much a part
of war as killing. 285 For these reason, I submit, we are bound to
accept the dictates of IHL in Segment 3 despite the fact that IHRL
arguably would provide the more specific and protective norm, at
least until such time that context-specific prohibitions under IHL
can be legislated or developed by States. 286 On this view, the
Ukrainian authorities’ orders to MNOs to censor the Russian media
sources participating in those operations would be permitted to do
so under international law, full stop.
V. CONCLUSION

Recall the overarching inquiries highlighted in the
Introduction: what is an ICT company to do when operating during
an international armed conflict like the one raging in Ukraine? How
should technology company executives respond to urgent
government demands—often conflicting—to propagate or censor
online content arising in the context of war, including
100 .

282. See supra notes 43, 66–69 and accompanying text.
283. See Katz, supra note 240, at 931–932; see also Shehabi, supra note 191, at 96–

284 . See Shehabi, supra note 191, at 3 (“Looking beyond treaty law, ‘there is
practically no international legal jurisprudence, commentaries, or academic literature’
that applies digital rights like the rights to privacy and data protection in times of armed
conflict.”).
285. See supra notes 241–45 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 223 and accompanying text (noting that IHL must
evolve to address disinformation in times of war); see also Shehabi, supra note 192 and
accompanying text (noting similar conclusion regarding privacy rights); but see O’Connell,
supra note 195, at 28.
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disinformation? And what of their demands to access the personal
data or communications of users, ostensibly to safeguard security
but nonetheless presenting the potential for abuse? Governments
make difficult demands of ICT companies by seeking to impose
heavy restrictions on the free flow of information and data privacy
via the latter’s digital and social media platforms and mobile
networks. This obligates the companies to devise new practices
and policies to respond to those demands and the exigent
circumstances that create them. To assist in that process, this
Article has mapped the contours of the framework under
international law that exists to guide company executives—as well
as other stakeholders—seeking to navigate a principled pathway
to addressing such challenges. Specifically, I have demarcated the
respective scopes of application of IHRL and IHL, as well as
clarified the normative interplay between those two bodies of law
using real and hypothetical examples drawn from the international
armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
The war in Ukraine is but the latest in a series of ongoing or
recent international armed conflicts that includes hostilities in
Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, India, Ethiopia, and Myanmar. 287
Unfortunately, it is unlikely to be the last. By delving into the IHLIHRL nexus and its function in the context of international armed
conflict, my aim has been to facilitate the constructive
consideration of international legal norms by private sector actors
and other non-governmental stakeholders invested in propagating
the principle of humanity in this most difficult of settings.
Academic and other studies of the function of digital rights during
armed conflict is only just beginning, so many practical issues
remain. In particular, there is a need “to discuss and develop
[further] guidance for risk assessment, due diligence, and impact
assessment in the ICT space.” 288 In this regard, I echo the
287. Global Conflict Tracker, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker [https://perma.cc/6YGY-Q53J](last visited
Aug. 28, 2022).
288 . Global Network Initiative, Submission to the Special Rapporteur Report on
Freedom of Expression in times of Armed Conflict and other Disturbances, at 6,
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sentiments of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression that progress in confronting these outstanding issues
will require “the proactive engagement of States, companies,
international organizations, civil society, and the media. The need
for multi-stakeholder dialogue and partnerships cannot be
overstated.” 289

https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/GNI-FoE-ConflictSubmission-12July22-1-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/66N5-SLLE].
289. Khan, supra note 86, at 18 ¶87.

